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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Taking as starting point the assumption that a number of debates connected with the 
problem of war had a significant impact on the central events of the Russian Revolution, 
this dissertation seeks to contribute to the understanding of these events by re-
examining the visions of war in the leadership of the Bolshevik movement, particularly 
in the thought of Vladimir Lenin. It offers a general critique of existing accounts by 
arguing that they have been based on a simplistic notion of the relation between 
ideology and expediency, and of the Bolshevik views on history, and that their tendency 
to identify the Bolshevik approach to war with Clausewitz’s theories has distorted the 
revolutionary undertones of Bolshevism. It proposes, it turn, an alternative 
interpretation, in which ideology and expediency are seen as mutually constitutive, the 
Bolshevik approach to history and its relation to their military views are clarified, and 
the impact of the revolutionary commitments of that political movement on their 
approach to war is stressed. This interpretation, it is argued, provides the best 
framework for understanding the Bolshevik position in the various debates over war 
issues, and reason why this movement diverged from other socialist approaches to war.   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
EPIGRAPHS 
 
 
 
From an European War a Revolution might surge up and the ruling classes 
would do well to consider this. But it may also result, and for a long period, in 
crises of counter-revolution, of furious reactions, of exasperated nationalism, of 
stifling dictatorship, of monstrous militarism, along a chain of retrograde 
violence...  
 
— Jean Jaurès, 1907 
 
 
 
Lenin's militarization of Marxism involved a substantial shift in the place of 
war in socialist ideology. War, while previously seen as a social evil imposed 
upon the working class, had never stood at the center of Marxist analysis of 
capitalism. Lenin put it there. 
 
— Jacob Kipp, 1985 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The major events that led to the rise and consolidation of the Soviet state were all 
connected in some form with the problem of war and, as a consequence, the various 
crucial points of that process were characterised by divergences over the interpretation 
of its implications and demands. It was the problem of war that ignited the general 
discontent against tsarism, both in 1905 and 1917, which contributed to the downfall of 
the monarchy.
1
 It was the problem of war which, in the eve of the First World War, 
divided the socialists in Europe and led to the collapse of the Second International 
Socialist, initiating the parting of ways between Bolshevism and European Social-
democracy.
2
 The context of war, in addition, convinced Lenin to push ahead the 
Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917.
3
 Opposed opinions over war had a role in the 
collapse of the Provisional Government,
4
 and in the failure of the coalition between 
Bolsheviks and Social Revolutionaries that provoked the Russian Civil War in 1918.
5
      
Nevertheless, in-depth study of the visions of war of the main actors of these 
events, in sociological and theoretical —as opposed to strategic— terms,6 has been 
hitherto scant. The most recent historical studies on the Russian Revolution, and on 
Bolshevik ideology in particular, make due reference to the contextual role of First 
World War and of the aforementioned controversies, yet most of them do not seek to 
provide a more detailed assessment of the various theories of war at the time, and their 
                                               
1
 See Robert Service, The Russian Revolution 1900-1927, 4th ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 
16. 
2
 For a succinct and classic summary of this controversy see E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-
1923, vol. III (London: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1953), 555-566.  
3
 See Paul Le Blanc, Lenin and the Revolutionary Party (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2015, fp 1993) 
195-196. 
4
 See Robert Service, The Russian Revolution, 64. 
5
 See Geoffrey Swain, Russia’s Civil War (Stroud, UK: The History Press, 2008), 26. 
6
 This dissertation concerns itself with theoretical aspects of war that usually fall within the domain of 
political theory and international theory, namely, the conceptions, place and role of war in a political 
ideology, including ideas about its origins, possible eradication, and social implications, leaving aside 
aspects of strategic planning which are more a concern of military theory.  
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possible influence in the events. A significant reason for this is, probably, the general 
assumption that the input of ideology in political action has historically been rather 
minimal and incapable to compete with the more demanding considerations of 
realpolitik, or the assumption that the relevance of social and economic factors would 
necessarily imply a diminished function of ideological factors.
7
 Studies on this subject 
seem to be confined to the Cold War era, in which the political pressures made the 
ideological factor highly relevant.
8
  
There might be substantive advantages, however, in taking a fresh look at the 
theories of war that were current during the time of the Russian Revolution, particularly 
those of Bolshevism, insofar as a better comprehension of the ideological factors might 
shed light on the dynamics of relevant historical events. In support for this methodology 
the result of recent scholarship that stresses the role of ideological aspects might be 
invoked, particularly the work of Michael Freeden,
9
 and the postulates of constructivism 
in International Relations theory that have recovered the connection between ideas, 
identity, interests, and action.
10
 In addition, the application ‘contextualist’ approaches to 
the study of ideas, such as those developed by Quentin Skinner
11
, might help to 
overcome the deficiencies of unhistorical character of many of the works produced 
during the Cold War era.      
This dissertation seeks to contribute to this task by examining the historical 
development and ideological structure of the views on war in the leadership of the 
Bolshevik movement, from its beginning to 1922, and to determine the impact that these 
views had in the development of the main events of the Russian Revolution, broadly 
conceived. It concentrates mainly in the views of Vladimir Lenin, on account of his 
dominant role in the intellectual and political history of the movement and his decisive 
influence in its mature theoretical outlook, and secondarily in the views of Lev Trotsky, 
whose role as head of the Red Army and Commissar of Foreign Affairs was crucial for 
                                               
7
 See Robert Service, The Russian Revolution, 6.  
8
 The most comprehensive study is Peter Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality (London-
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975). E.H. Carr provides a good summary with a more historical 
approach in ‘The Marxist Attitude to War’, in The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. III, 549-566. 
9
 See Michael Freeden, ‘Thinking Politically and Thinking about Politics: language, interpretation, and 
ideology’ in Marc Stears and David Leopold (eds), Political Theory: Method and Approaches (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 2008), 196-215. 
10
 See Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Constructivism’, in Burchill, S., et al, Theories of International Relations 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 198. 
11
 See Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory, 8 (1), 
1969, 3-53.   
 9 
 
the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War.
12
 The views of party members such as 
Kamenev, Bukharin, and Zinoviev will be referred to in the pertinent sections, primarily 
as laying an alternative perspective to that of Lenin, but they will receive less attention 
as their theoretical contribution appears to be less prominent in the subject of war than 
in other subjects. 
The title of this dissertation alludes to a characterisation made by historian Jacob 
Kipp’s of Lenin’s and by extension of Bolshevik mature thought on war,13 the main trait 
of which was the placement of ‘revolutionary war’ at the heart of the socialist 
Revolution, in contradistinction to what it has been interpreted as the understanding of 
war in Marxism and Western European socialism. This investigation aims at unearthing 
the ideological and historical sources that provide the best explanations of this 
development, in critical interaction with the scholarship produced on the subject in the 
Cold War era and after, but intending to advance a new interpretation that overcomes 
weaknesses of previous accounts. It purports to accomplish this by assessing the subject 
with the aid of the methodological assumptions developed recently in the discipline of 
intellectual history, and with the help of contemporary perspectives on international 
relations theory, particularly constructivism.   
This investigation proposes three main contributions to current scholarship. 
Firstly, it departs from the common view that associates the Bolshevik outlook and 
Lenin’s in particular, in the subject of war, with Clausewitz and his theories and 
legacies, arguing that such association —based mostly in taking Lenin’s statements in a 
face value— has led more to distortion than to understanding. From the well-known fact 
that Lenin profusely read and claimed to have adopted Clausewitz’s theories, especially 
the latter’s classical dictum ‘war is the continuation of policy by other means’, a direct 
influence has often been maintained, even if Lenin’s original modifications to the theory 
were also pointed out.
14
 This interpretation, it is contended here, is in risk of blurring 
the revolutionary undertones of the Bolshevik approach to war. The latter is better 
understood, instead, as Anatol Rapoport has argued, as part of the so-called 
                                               
12
 See Geoffrey Swain, Trotsky (London: Routledge, 2014), 210. 
13
 Jacob Kipp, ‘Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism 1914-1921’, Military Affairs, 
October 1985, 189. 
14
 Kipp argued, for instance, that ‘Lenin embraced Clausewitz in a fashion never done by Marx or Engels. 
[…] Lenin's reading of Clausewitz assumed central significance with the increasing militarization of 
Lenin's thought […].’ See Jacob Kipp, Lenin and Clausewitz, 186. 
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‘eschatological school’ of the philosophy of war, the main tenet of which is the belief in 
all-out war as necessary for a critical moment which will bring about a future scenario 
in which war is abolished altogether.
15
  
The dissertation, hence, takes Jacob Kipp’s ‘militarization of Marxism’ as main 
theme, but offers an alternative interpretation of it than Kipp’s and the many authors 
who have written in a similar vein. The argument is not a restatement of Rapoport’s 
claim, however. A distinctive interpretation of the place of Bolshevism in this 
‘eschatological’ tradition is offered here, and it is argued that this distinction is not of 
mere academic interest, but has rather significant implications for the understanding of 
the relation between Bolshevism and war. In connection to this, the second contribution 
consists in the claim that the Bolshevik theory of war is better understood in connection 
with the Bolshevik view of history, and that the decisive point of the latter was not a 
faith in the inevitability of communism, as has been argued, but rather the belief of the 
imperatives of a revolutionary time or moment. The implications of this distinction for 
Bolshevik military theory are correspondingly laid out. 
The third main proposed contribution concerns the relation between ideology 
and experience in Bolshevism, both in general and in relation to the problem of war in 
particular. This dissertation rejects the positions of both those who claim that during the 
Russian Revolution ideological commitments had prominence over expediency, and 
vice versa,
16
 and argues that both are based on an inadequate abstract separation which 
cannot accurately represent the complex form in which these two elements interact in 
practice. Relying on constructivist scholarship developed in International Relations 
theory, an interpretation is proposed here, instead, that conceives of ideology and 
experience as mutually —yet not in a uniform or constant way— constituted. Historical 
circumstances had a decisive role, it is contended here, but they were read and 
interpreted through the prism of ideology, and the latter was appropriated and 
emphasised according to the necessities imposed by action. 
                                               
15
 Anatol Rapoport, ‘Introduction’ in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, J.J. Graham translation (Middlesex, 
UK: Penguin Books, 1968) 15. 
16
 For a general summary of the debates on the role of ideological factors in the study of the Russian 
Revolution, see Robert Service, The Russian Revolution, 6-8. A thorough summary of the Cold War era 
debates on ideology and expediency in the Soviet Union is offered in Robert A. Jones, The Soviet 
Concept of “Limited Sovereignty” from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Brezhnev Doctrine (New York, NY: St 
Martin Press, 1990), 97-103. 
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The research problem, methodology, literature review, and main argument are 
described in the first chapter. In order to reconstruct the main elements of the 
intellectual context in which the Bolshevik approach to war developed, the second 
chapter briefly outlines the main theoretical traditions of war in 19
th
 century Europe and 
Russia, and culminates with an exposition of the approach to war in the socialist 
tradition, particularly in Marx and Engels. The third chapter traces the development of 
the Bolshevik views on war from the beginning of the political movement to the eve of 
First World War. The fourth chapter focus in the theoretical developments brought 
about by the latter, and the interaction of ideology and experience in the Russian 
Revolution and the Russian Civil War. The fifth chapter, finally, is concerned with the 
mature form of the theory as manifested in the foreign policy of the early Soviet State 
and the Comintern.                 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter lays out the contours of the problem of investigation, the main research 
questions, the objectives, the relevance of the topic and the methodology employed. It 
sketches the main structure and purposes of the process of research that has taken place 
for the writing of this dissertation, and raises the main questions that the argument that 
is offered in the next chapter is seeking to address.  
 
 
Research Puzzle 
 
The majority of European socialist movements of the late 19th and early 20th century 
shared a more or less substantive agreement in a number of general principles on the 
character of war. They tended to associate war and social violence with underlying 
economic and social problems, and argued that only a radical solution of these problems 
would bring about an enduring peace,
17
 and condemned militarism, military culture, and 
the arms race.
18
 Nevertheless, more concrete points such as the role of war in the 
socialist revolution, the duties of the socialists in regard to the military affairs of their 
own countries, the socialist position in relation with international conflicts, the 
defensive/aggressive war distinction, and others, were object of sharp disagreement 
among both non-Marxists and Marxists, and within the Marxists themselves, and these 
disagreements were tied to the events that led to the estrangement of the various 
socialist movements in pre-Fascist Europe.    
                                               
17
 W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels, and Tolstoy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 68. 
18
 E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. III, 549. 
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Claiming fidelity to and the rightest understanding of Marxism, and in 
opposition to the European socialists whom they saw as traitors of the cause on account 
of their attitude towards First World War,
19
 the Bolsheviks consolidated almost in 
isolation their own tradition of socialism and their own revolution in Russia, developing 
an articulated and aggressive military outlook and praxis. War accompanied the whole 
Bolshevik experiment: they adopted the idea of the inevitability of the civil war in a 
revolution,
20
 seized power and engaged in a long and bloody civil war in order to 
consolidate their dictatorship,
21
 established a standing army, and conducted an 
aggressive —yet short-lived— foreign policy in Eastern Europe with the purpose of 
establishing new Communist regimes, in the context of what they believed to be an 
imminent world socialist revolution.
22
 Thus, the Bolsheviks developed military 
institutions and practices similar in appearance to those which socialism condemned 
among the capitalists, but which they sought to justify on the grounds of different 
principles and purposes.   
The diverging paths among the socialists were not only reflected in the general 
Bolshevik outlook and in its European socialist criticism. As said before, various crucial 
events in the historical process that led to the consolidation of the Soviet state were 
decisively influenced by disputes, both domestic and international, over the most 
convenient position for the socialist movement in face of war, disputes in which more 
general ideological considerations were often invoked, and which determined the 
ultimate fate and political success of Bolshevism. Among these, the most salient were: 
 
1. The aftermath of Bloody Sunday (1905). The national uprisings that followed the 
massacre convinced the Russian socialists that the opportunity had arrived for 
the overthrowing of the monarchy and the establishment of a democratic 
republic. However, while the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries insisted in 
focusing on activities such as propaganda and agitation, and strategic 
accommodation in the incoming republic, Lenin argued that the impending task 
                                               
19
 Georges Haupt, Socialism and the Great War: the Collapse of the Second International (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978), 219. 
20
 Israel Getzler, ‘Lenin’s Conception of Revolution as Civil War’, The Slavonic and East European 
Review, 74:3 (London: Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, 1996), 
464-5 
21
 Geoffrey Swain, Russia’s Civil War, 21. 
22
 See Geoffrey Swain, Russia’s Civil War, 65-8 
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was to arm the workers and to prepare an immediate armed attack on the 
monarchy, since civil war was a necessary step in the way towards socialism. 
Given that this revolutionary moment ended in no more than a few liberal 
concessions from the monarchy, the significance of the dispute is not strong, but 
it certainly contributed to the estrangement between the Bolsheviks, the 
Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries.  
2. The collapse of the Second International (1914). The socialists had been divided 
over the socialist position towards a possible European war since the time of the 
First International.
23
 A crucial question for them was whether the workers of the 
various countries should be encouraged to perform their patriotic duties or 
should instead be called for anti-war action. French socialists such as Jaures and 
Vaillant insisted in organizing a general strike against the war, but they met with 
the opposition of the German socialists, who were afraid of the potential 
political consequences.
24
 Others insisted in complete neutrality, or in the duty of 
national defence. Lenin, in turn, argued that the context of the international war 
should be used for provoking internal revolutions. When the Germans voted for 
war credits, Lenin accused the European socialists of capitulating to imperialism 
and chauvinism. Lenin’s position was decisive for his revolutionary movement. 
This controversy established a deep hostility between Bolshevism and European 
socialism, a hostility that will subsequently increase as many European socialists 
opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power.  
3. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918). After seizing power in 1917, the Bolsheviks 
were forced to back down and agreed to form a coalition government with the 
Social Revolutionaries. This coalition, however, collapsed after Lenin decided to 
seek peace terms with Germany, a decision which no Social Revolutionary 
could support, and that was at odds with the view of fellow Bolsheviks such as 
Trotsky and Bukharin. This collapse provoked the formation of a competing 
Social Revolutionary government and the onset of the Russian civil war.
25
 It 
turned the Allies against the Bolshevik too, given that they were interested in 
supporting the side that could maintain the Eastern front opened. 
                                               
23
 E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. III, 552. 
24
 Georges Haupt, Socialism and the Great War, 21. 
25
 Geoffrey Swain, Russia’s Civil War, 26. 
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4. The Westward offensive of the Red Army and the Comintern (1918-1923). 
Notwithstanding the problems associated with an internal civil war, foreign 
intervention, and a chaotic administration, the Bolsheviks decided to pursue an 
aggressive foreign policy in Eastern Europe, aiming at fostering Communist 
revolutions in the territories liberated from German occupation after the end of 
the war.
26
 The results of these campaigns, and particularly of the subsequent war 
with Poland, were decisive in shaping the character, policies, and expectations 
of Bolshevism, and its state. It marked the ‘turning inward’ of the post-Leninist 
Bolshevik foreign policy that lasted until 1939. They were coordinated through 
the Third International Socialist or Comintern, in which aspects concerning the 
relation between war and the world revolution were also a matter of controversy. 
 
It is clear thus that the Bolshevik positions —or in most cases the positions formulated 
by Lenin— on issues that were connected with war, both domestic and international, 
was crucial in determining the direction and effects of events that, in turn, proved to be 
necessary for the Bolshevik political survival and ultimate —albeit fragile— success. 
That position materialized in the context of disputes with political rivals, unstable allies, 
and enemies, in which issues on the interpretation of the Marxist canon, socialist 
ideology, and the particular conditions of Russia were intensely ransacked, and in which 
general aspects on the character of war were often discussed. Illustrating the origins of 
these positions, both intellectual and historical, therefore, might help to better 
understand these events, and the general history of the Russian Revolution and its 
consequences as a whole. This dissertation seeks to contribute to this task by helping to 
recover the historical evolution of the Bolsheviks views on war.  
 
 
Research Questions 
 
The starting point of this dissertation, as described above —that debates on war issues 
were influential for crucial historical events, and that understanding these debates might 
help the comprehension of these events— and the focus on the Bolshevik positions in 
                                               
26
 For a summary of the Bolshevik views on spreading the revolution through military intervention see 
Robert Jones, The Soviet Concept of ‘Limited Sovereignty’, 31-35. 
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particular, raises an initial general problem: can these Bolshevik positions be explained 
solely in reference to the situation to which they were connected, or to put it in more 
familiar terms, were these positions the pure fruit of realpolitik, of seeking the most 
expedient advantages of particular situations? Or, on the contrary, it is possible to admit 
a decisive influence of such factors as ideology, or intellectual context, economic 
factors, and so on? If the first question is answered in the affirmative, the task would be 
simply to determine how the agents manipulated their ideology as to suit the situation; if 
the second is given a positive response, then, a study of ideological structures and their 
consequences is required.    
This dissertation seeks to provide an answer to these questions by examining to 
what extent dynamic ideological structures influenced the corresponding events. The 
assumption that rules out the possibility of admitting a decisive role to ideology, or only 
accepts to give to it a significantly diminished function, is then rejected as a matter of 
principle, and the methodological grounds for this rejection are laid out in the second 
chapter. Given that, in examining ideological structures, this dissertation assumes a 
unitary group-agent —the Bolshevik movement— and a unitary tradition —
Bolshevism— it also seeks to provide an account of their general intellectual 
development. A second general problem that concerns it is, therefore, the identification 
of the sources of the mature military outlook and praxis of Bolshevism, considered 
against the background of the broad socialist tradition, and its relation with the process 
of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet experiment, as a whole.      
The research questions could be, then, summarised as follows: firstly, why the 
Bolshevik took these positions on war issues?; secondly, what input did the ideology 
had in these positions, and in which terms?; thirdly, what explains the process of 
‘militarisation’ of Bolshevism?; and fourthly, what the possible answers to these 
questions say about the historical process of the Russian Revolution? More specific 
questions, derived from the latter, include: (a) what is the relation between the 
Bolshevik theory of war and the intellectual sources of socialism, and specifically Marx 
and Engels?; (b) what is the role of the distinctive historical aspects of the Bolshevik 
experience in its doctrinal evolution concerning war?; (c) which factors explain the 
distance between the approach taken by the Bolsheviks and those taken by other 
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European socialists, in relation to the problem of war?; and, finally, (d) which 
alternative approaches to war were discarded by the Bolsheviks, and why?  
As will be manifested below, this dissertation contends that the existing 
literature provides valuable insights on these questions, but these insights are 
insufficient to produce an entirely satisfactory answer to all of them. Building upon the 
results of the revision and analysis of the primary and secondary sources that constituted 
the main task of this research project, this dissertation proposes that the general 
argument sketched in the introduction and described at length in the second chapter 
provides the most convincing explanation of all these problems, and seeks to illustrate it 
in the subsequent chapters. Some connected aspects still require further research as, for 
example, the role of economic and social factors, but the conclusions proposed here 
provide a solid basis for reference for future work. 
 
 
Object and Purpose of this Investigation  
 
The object of study of this dissertation is constituted by the meaning and forms of the 
idea of war, broadly conceived, in the thought of the leadership of the Bolshevik 
political movement, from 1902 to 1922. The timeframe starts by 1902 because in this 
year was published Lenin’s famous pamphlet ‘What is to be done?’ which laid out the 
basis for Bolshevik political thought, especially through the formulation of doctrine of 
the vanguard party of professional revolutionaries which was a centre of the 
Bolshevik/Menshevik split in the following year. The investigation ends by 1922, in 
turn, because in that year the transition from post-revolutionary Bolshevism to the 
consolidated Soviet state was already in march and such changes as the end of the Civil 
War, the waning of Lenin’s authority, and the New Economic Policy involved a 
political and ideological transformation that changed the Soviet approach to war in 
substantive aspects. 
The main purpose is to elucidate the evolution of the ideas on war in 
Bolshevism, and the interaction of these ideas with relevant historical facts, in order to 
enhance the comprehension of both Bolshevism and the general events to which these 
facts were connected, particularly the Russian Revolution broadly conceived.  On 
 18 
 
account of this purpose, the investigation is focused in those ideas that were influential 
in the movement, namely, the ideas of Lenin. The ideas of figures such as Trotsky, 
Bukharin, Kamenev, Radek, and Zinoviev, are referred to in connection to some 
relevant events only. Trotsky and Bukharin are highly relevant, but limitation of space 
has prevented more attention to them. The investigation focuses in both the events that 
are crucial for the history of Bolshevism in general, and those that are connected 
specifically to military issues. It should be pointed out, finally, that this dissertation 
concerns itself with the theoretical or ‘philosophical’ aspects of war —its origins, 
causes, and role in history— rather than with strategic issues. Given the limitation in 
space, and considering methodological convenience, the connection between these two 
domains is not included within its scope, and should be reserved for future research.     
 
 
Relevance of the Subject 
 
Revisiting the historical development and ideological content of Bolshevik theories of 
war might provide valuable contributions to the fields of (a) Russian and Soviet history, 
(b) global socialist history, and more generally to (c) the intellectual history and history 
of political thought, particularly in relation to traditions of war and peace. The main 
reason for the relevance of the subject has already been sketched in the introduction, 
namely, the opportunity of enhancing the understanding of the Russian Revolution, a 
theme that has regained attention as the centenary of its main events is approaching. It 
might be added that the results of this investigation might be helpful for the 
understanding the place of the idea of war in the socialist tradition, broadly conceived, 
and of the political thought that was generated in response to First World War.  
Its contribution to the historical study of political thought in connection with war 
might prove relevant, primarily, because most of the available intellectual histories of 
the philosophy and theory of war have been centred in canonical works that were 
influential in Western Europe and the United States, at the expense of other less 
influential speculative traditions, including Bolshevik and Soviet thought. The study of 
the latter has mostly been confined to area studies where the subject has certainly been 
explored with rigour, but without the methodological benefits of the comparative and 
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interdisciplinary approach of intellectual history. This neglect is not insignificant, if the 
role of the early Bolshevik state and the Soviet Union as international actors in the 
twentieth century is taking into consideration. That the Bolshevik theory of war is 
relevant to the understanding of Soviet military history is made clear by the canonical 
character which Lenin’s work possessed during the Soviet experience.   
Secondly, the works covering the history of philosophical and theoretical 
approaches to war are considerably less numerous than the works devoted to technical 
and strategic military aspects, and to the political history of wars. The reason for this 
situation is, perhaps, that most treatments of war in political thought have been 
secondary to the theoretical systems of the respective authors and, besides Carl 
Clausewitz, few of these thinkers developed systematic theories of war. In addition, as 
Martin Wight famously noted,
27
 the historical speculative tradition on the international 
—and it might be added here, of the phenomenon of war— is considerably weaker than 
the speculative tradition on the character of the state, and new intellectual histories on 
the philosophy and history of war, such as the present investigation, might contribute to 
fill this vacuum. And thirdly, the discipline of intellectual history is of recent origins 
and possesses an expanding research agenda,
28
 and new venues of research might be 
opened for it through efforts of this character.        
A potential result with outcomes of more contemporary relevance that can be 
offered by this investigation is the framing of historical considerations and 
interpretations that can prove insightful if they are connected with recent debates in 
political theory, especially in relation to the nature of revolutionary politics, the problem 
of political violence, and the transformation of war ethics. Significant research has been 
recently conducted on the multiple forms in which the agents of political violence 
rationalise, justify and excuse their actions,
29
 and the case of Bolshevism can provide 
interesting data. Political theorists and philosophers that are discussing the classic 
approach of war ethics and its suitability or unsuitability for the current conditions
30
 
might find interesting to explore how historical movements interacted with traditions 
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such as Just War theory, and this research might provide solid information on that 
subject. 
 
 
Methodology and Possible Limitations 
 
The logical structure of this work might be summarised as follows: the first chapter 
describes the research problem, whereas the second chapter delineates the argument that 
is proposed as providing a compelling interpretation of the historical data and solution 
to the research questions. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters offer a historical 
narrative and analysis in the context of which evidence for the argument is illustrated. 
The second chapter was elaborated during the last phases of research and, hence, the 
general argument which it presents is the product of a previous process of assessment of 
the historical data; in the dissertation, nevertheless, the general argument is offered at 
the beginning in order to permit a reading of the historical data through its lenses. This 
research process has relied on methodological assumptions taken from recent historical 
scholarship, particularly in the fields of intellectual history and Soviet history, and from 
constructivist work as developed in International Relations Theory.      
This is essentially a process of research focused on ideas, but which seeks to 
depart from a fundamental feature of the traditional approach of what has been called 
‘history of ideas’, namely, the tendency to define ideas in detachment from the context 
in which they emerged. This objective is pursued by employing the methods of the 
emergent discipline of intellectual history which aims at understanding ideas in 
connection with historical context. There has been, in this sense, a careful attention in 
determining how the ideological development described is interdependent with 
historical circumstances in which it took place, and how these factors were mutually 
reinforced. The aforementioned method has been complemented with a more theoretical 
hermeneutics that seeks to understand the internal consistency or inconsistency of the 
various historical arguments, in order to clarify the role that these features had in 
subsequent historical and ideological developments. 
The recovery of ideas has been done through the examination of primary sources 
in interaction with scholarship both from the Cold War era and contemporary. The 
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sources have not been consulted in the original languages, but they are available in 
English through publications made by the official Soviet publishing houses and many 
Western publishers. The risk that these translations might have inaccuracies or 
distortions as a result of the ideological biases of the translators and publishers, 
considering especially that many of these publications date from the Cold War era, 
should certainly be acknowledged. Nevertheless, the English translations are of widely 
use in scholarship by sympathizers of Bolshevism, critics and ideologically-
uncommitted scholars alike, and hence it has been assumed in this dissertation that such 
risk might be safely estimated as not very significant.    
Most of the secondary literature consulted is the product of the American, 
German-American and British scholarship produced in leading centres for Soviet and 
Russian Studies, both from the Cold War era and contemporary. The main limitation for 
this project has been the extensive process of synthetisation of information that was 
forced by its scope, a process that might have unintendedly excluded relevant 
information, or allowed insufficient data to support conclusively a determinate 
conclusion. Consequently, efforts have been done in order to appropriately support the 
main contentions of this work despite such conditions. An obstacle has been, evidently, 
all the limitations that are tied to the interpretations of texts, particularly in connection 
with issues such as purpose of discourse, intention, power relations involved in speech, 
personal honesty, and biases. The methodology employed has helped to overcome some 
of these problems by making the process more historically sensitive.   
Given the structure of this thesis, in which a framework of interpretation is given 
initially and historical facts are subsequently assessed through its lenses, the main of the 
potential risks of it that might come to the mind of the reader is the possibility of 
imposing upon the facts an artificial schema, or transposing conceptual structures to a 
time in which they were not relevant, then finding in the facts what the author expects to 
find rather than what the facts say about themselves. The author of this dissertation is 
aware of this danger but, nevertheless, should reiterate that the argument was the result 
of an initial assessment of the sources rather than the starting assumption for this 
investigation, and it is presented here as a convincing outcome of what the source can 
tell the modern reader. Whether this dissertation succeeded in overcoming this and the 
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previously-mentioned limitations, as it claims to have done, it is for the specialists to 
say.    
The clarification should be made that this dissertation is not made with the 
purpose of exposing the crimes of Bolshevik militarism, nor much less to provide 
justifications for Bolshevik practice. Its unique purpose is to contribute to the 
understanding of a historical process that can offer valuable lessons for contemporary 
issues. The legitimacy of exposing crimes in processes of a very tragic character, such 
as the Russian Civil War, is certainly not denied here, but the intention of pursuing 
historical scholarship for this purpose might often contribute to obscuring the 
complexity of historical events, as critics of the works of Richard Pipes have insisted. 
Unfortunately, ideologically-uncommitted scholarship conducted for the sake of 
understanding is often accused of containing subtle apologies for atrocities when it is 
not energetic enough in exposing crimes. In some cases, this accusation can be reliable, 
but it should be made clear that all these purposes are foreign to the motivation of this 
dissertation.        
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ‘ESCHATOLOGICAL’ APPROACH TO WAR: A NEW ARGUMENT 
 
 
This chapter describes the main argument of this dissertation, the content of which has 
already been sketched in the introduction. It is proposed here that this argument best 
explains why the leadership of the Bolshevik party took the above-described historical 
positions on the issue of war that were decisive in the historical process of the Russian 
Revolution. The argument possesses three main components connected, respectively, 
with the overarching vision of war, the relation between the latter and theory of history, 
and the relation between ideology and experience. But before these three components 
are described, this chapter offers a review of the existing literature, and proposes 
arguments to prove why this literature cannot provide a sufficient and comprehensive 
response to the research questions. This literature review shows the vacuum in the 
existing scholarship that the contribution of this dissertation seeks to fill out.   
 
 
Literature Review 
 
As is well-known, western scholarship on the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union 
in general had been roughly divided between the traditional Cold War era —often called 
the ‘totalitarian’31— ‘school’ that relied on the assumption of the primary importance of 
politics, and the so-called ‘revisionist school’ which, in the context of the emergence of 
social and cultural history in the 1960s and 1970s, relied more in the role of factors such 
as economy, and social movements and processes.
32
 Proponents of the ‘revisionist 
school’ reacted against what they took as being a distorting influence of Cold War 
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ideology in Russian studies, whereas their critics in the ‘totalitarian school’ charged 
them of downplaying  the ruthlessness and authoritarianism of the Bolsheviks. Scholars 
such as Robert Service and Orlando Figes have recently proposed a more eclectic 
approach that incorporates the insights of both ‘schools’.33      
Undoubtedly, works produced by scholars in the two aforementioned traditions, 
both in reference to the whole process of the Russian Revolution or specifically to the 
issue of war in Bolshevik thought, offer substantive information and convincing 
arguments in many aspects. Nevertheless, it is contended here that they are not entirely 
capable of offering specific and sound responses to the research questions raised above. 
Scholars working of high politics have analysed Bolshevik and Soviet ideology 
intensively, but most of them have not gone deeper in exploring Bolshevik thought in 
particular, and when they have done so, they have produced works that lack a proper 
historical dimension, or have a too simplistic understanding of the relation between 
ideology and practice. Social historians have been too ready to deny the role of ideology 
or ideas in general, a role that has been properly rediscovered in other fields, as it will 
be demonstrated in the next chapter.      
In the literature at least two ‘grand’ interpretations of Bolshevism have been set 
forth, the core of which had significant implications for the understanding of the 
Bolshevik ideological and material militarisation. The first one is that the most salient 
aspects of Bolshevik politics were clearly devised in their ideological statements and, 
hence, their politics was no more than the practical application of their views. 
According to this view, it is possible to find in Bolshevik ideology all the elements that 
originated the main features of the dictatorship established in Russia after 1917. Most 
works that can be associated with the ‘totalitarian’ school sided with this line of 
interpretation. Thus, for example, in respect to war and Bolshevism, historian Israel 
Getzler has argued that Lenin stood apart from other revolutionaries for ‘his simplistic, 
narrow and brutal understanding of revolution as civil war tout court’ and that ‘[c]ivil 
war is what Lenin wanted and civil war is what he got’.34  
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Bolshevik ideology was not, of course, perceived as static, and its evolution was 
taken into account when this argument was made. Werner Hahlweg
35
 and many others 
pointed to Lenin’s encounter with Clausewitz’s writings as a turning point in the 
development of the Bolshevik view of war, whereas Jacob Kipp highlighted Lenin’s 
rediscovery of Hegel and dialectics.
36
 A variant of this position was the claim that there 
were two intellectual and political traditions in conflict in Bolshevik ideology, namely, 
an articulated and systematic ‘orthodox’ Marxism and an impulsive Russian 
Jacobinism, and that the latter factor eventually imposed itself, and became dominant in 
the dictatorship and militarisation established by the Bolsheviks.
37
 In this schema, the 
Bolshevik approach to war might be seen, to some extent, as an outgrowth of the 
tradition going back to radical French revolutionaries that identified civil war with 
national liberation.
38
 Other authors focused less in the ideology and more in the 
Bolshevik personal intransigence and ruthlessness as the source of their most warlike 
ideas.
39
  
The other ‘grand’ view was based on the assumption that Bolshevik dictatorial 
politics and its militarism were not so much the result of ideological presuppositions, 
but rather of historical contingencies. In this sense, it was said that the Bolsheviks were 
forced by the historical circumstances to adopt more dictatorial practices and to follow 
the path of militarisation.
40
 Statements in this direction can naturally be found in the 
writings of the apologists of the regime, but also among sympathetic scholars such as 
E.H. Carr,
41
 and even among critics of the regime such as Bertrand Russell.
42
 The 
argument was often the result of the intention of separating Bolshevism from its 
ideological origins in socialism and Marxism, in order to dissociate the latter from the 
ruthless Bolshevik politics. In this line of interpretation, Bolshevik methods and military 
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praxis have been compared to the methods Fascism, the adoption of which was 
allegedly the outcome of the pressure of the time.
43
   
Generally, the latter argument was framed either in terms of necessities for 
survival, in the context of the civil war and the intervention of the entente, or in terms of 
pure opportunism of the Bolsheviks, who were portrayed as experts of realpolitik for 
whom war and terror were means to be freely employed as long as they were expedient, 
and who adapted their ideology to make it suitable to their objectives at the moment.
44
 
Social historians and ‘revisionists’, have often tended to offer support for this 
interpretation, insofar as they try to stress the social and cultural influences of the 
events, rather than the ideas of the agents. Sheila Fitzpatrick has described the 
dictatorial and militaristic practices of Bolshevism, in this sense, as the product of 
unforeseen contingencies.
45
 
As mentioned before scholars such as Robert Service and Orlando Figes have 
sought to bypass the divisions both between the ‘totalitarian’ school and the 
‘revisionists’, and between those who stress ideology and historical experience, by 
presenting an eclectic framework of interpretation. Robert Service, for instance, has 
argued that ‘[t]he revisionists were right to broaden the scope of factors explaining the 
outcome of October Revolution; their critics were equally correct in insisting that 
Bolshevik doctrines and policies were always highly authoritarian.’46 Many of these 
authors highlight the need to take into account both ideology and expediency in the 
analysis, but they do not offer a full account of how the relation of these elements 
should be understood in connection to the historical events, and their broader historical 
implications. 
In addition, as the enthusiasm of the ‘archival revolution’ after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union waned, recent scholarship on Bolshevism has moved to positions in 
which the ideological origins of its practices have been reaffirmed, albeit overcoming 
the lack of historicity and detachment of context that was bothersome to social 
historians. The works of James Ryan, who has insisted in the intellectual origins of 
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Lenin’s approach to political violence, are an example of this trend.47 Before them, 
authors such as A.J. Polan
48
 and Neil Harding had already convincingly demonstrated 
the influence of Bolshevik ideology, its articulateness and complexity —but not 
necessarily consistency, though— against those who tried to explain Bolshevik politics 
solely in terms of the psychology or lust of power of its practitioners.  
This dissertation shares with both many Cold War era works and the recent 
scholarly trend described above the assumption of the relevance Bolshevik ideology for 
their own historical positions, particularly on the issues of war. The work of social 
historians and ‘revisionists’ is highly valuable for the present purposes, but their 
tendency to downplay the role of ideology is, in conformity with the latter general 
assumption, rejected. Nevertheless, in overall terms, it is contended here that the 
existing works on Bolshevik thought, both old and recent, cannot offer a proper and 
satisfying answer to the various research questions proposed previously, and this 
dissertation seeks to offer what its author considers to be the most appropriate 
framework of interpretation.     
Old works on Bolshevism can certainly be valuable and insightful, but as 
children of their time, they share with their contemporaries certain features that have 
subsequently been discredited by advances in scholarship. These include not only the 
already mentioned lack of historical perspective and the tendency to define ideas in 
isolation, but also a problematic hermeneutics in which the concerns of the time of the 
scholar were often transposed into the mind of the author, then blurring his/her original 
intention, a problem that became acute in the context of the Cold War. It can be argued, 
also that their arguments were often built upon a simplistic understanding of ideas and 
causation that could not capture the complex process in which ideas are translated into 
reality.     
     These problems are particularly evident in the case of the treatment of Lenin’s 
encounter with Clausewitz’s writings, and the alleged absorption of his ideas by 
Bolshevik political thought. Although the modification of Clausewitz ideas by Lenin is 
often acknowledged, the distance of both systems of thought is often not taken into 
consideration, and dependence of their ideas is not critically assessed. This has resulted, 
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in estimation of the author of this dissertation, in the transposition of problems and 
tensions that are proper to Clausewitz into Bolshevism, for which, having a different 
ideological framework, most of these tensions were foreign. Reading Lenin through the 
lenses of Clausewitz, however, or seeking intellectual origins of Lenin’s actions in 
Clausewitz’s ideas, as is arguably the case in a significant number of authors, is 
accompanied by the risk of losing sight of the distinctive aspects of Bolshevik ideology, 
particularly its revolutionary character, which is an aspect totally absent in Clausewitz.
49
 
In addition, the forms in which the problem of the relation between ideology and 
experience has been framed are not entirely satisfactory. This dissertation places itself 
in the tradition of those who have sought an eclectic solution to this problem by giving 
explanatory historical value to both ideas and experience, but is built on the assumption 
that recent authors have not expressed that correlation with enough clarity and 
precision. The topic of war, considered in its political aspects —as opposed to 
strategic— has not figured among the main concerns of these recent works, although the 
topic hitherto covered —such as political violence— are indirectly related. Thus, there 
is also a need to bring into the topic of war what recent scholarship on Bolshevik and 
Soviet ideology has achieved by the implementation of new methodologies, particularly 
those of intellectual history. 
More specific shortcomings of the existing literature on the Bolshevik approach 
to war are not difficult to identify. Most of these works are not systematic in nature, or 
not focused in war in particular. And systematic treatments such as Peter Vigor’s,50 
notwithstanding their comprehensiveness, fail to incorporate an appropriate historical 
dimension, and it is difficult to draw concise explanations of specific historical facts 
from their generalisations. Other works, including monographs and articles such as 
those already cited by Carr, Hahlweg and Kipp, are thoroughly historical but their 
ideological genealogies focus in particular sources and ideas, and leave outside some 
aspects that are highly relevant. Thus, for instance, there has been little attention of 
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Engels’ views on the possibility of a World War, and the possible influence of these 
views on the Bolsheviks. 
There are a number of additional circumstances that could make this topic 
worthy of a fresh look. The many studies on the Russian Revolution contain significant 
details about First World War and its relation with the Revolution, but they often do not 
give substantive consideration to the Bolsheviks’ views of war, and how they interacted 
with their political strategies. Studies on the Bolshevik theories of war, in turn, often fail 
to explore deeply the implications of the Bolshevik approach to war for the events of the 
Revolution, and to elucidate thus what the distinctive input of that approach was. In 
addition, studies on Bolshevik ideology often fail to place it in the broader context of 
the European socialist tradition, and thus miss the opportunity of elucidating how it 
developed in interdependence and opposition to rival accounts. A new evaluation of the 
subject that considers how European debates affected Bolshevik thought on war appears 
to be opportune.        
 
 
Main Argument  
 
This dissertation offers an alternative interpretation of the Bolshevik approach to war 
than those proposed by these writings, especially those that placed it as an inheritor of 
Clausewitzian warfare, seeks to bring to fore its revolutionary underpinnings and its 
overarching implications for both theory and practice, and argues that this interpretation 
allows to better understand the Bolshevik approach within the framework of its 
ideological universe, and hence, it can provide a better explanation of the historical 
positions taken by the Bolsheviks on the issue of war. The three key elements of this 
interpretation have been sketched in the introduction in order of relevance. In the 
following section they are described in inverse order, inasmuch as the two last elements 
described in the introduction work as precondition for the first and main contribution. 
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a) The Mutual Constitution of Ideology and Experience 
 
The author of this dissertation accepts neither the theories which explain the Bolshevik 
approach to war in terms of ideological commitments alone, nor those that explain it 
solely in terms of experience or interest. The claim that ideology has legitimising and 
mobilising function, but has no bearing on or no predominance in the definition of 
policy or in political action seems to be still widespread,
51
 probably as a result of 
intellectual legacies of ‘orthodox’ Marxism itself, but cannot be accepted. As David 
Comey has argued, the Bolshevik dealings with issues such as the collectivisation of 
agriculture cannot be understood without including the input of the ideology,
52
 and 
some of the Bolshevik policies, particularly those related to the peasantry,
53
 or the 
westward offensive of the Red Army during the civil war, were clearly dysfunctional 
and risky for the regime, suggesting that expediency was not a lonely voice for 
Bolshevik policy-making.  
Nor it is possible to isolate the ideas and to define them in a sort of trans-
historical form, and to admit that the Bolshevik approach to war was entirely the 
product of a planned and already-established ideology. The changing character of 
Bolshevik policy, its responsiveness and adaptation to the situations, the pragmatism 
and the art of realpolitik that was notable in the Bolshevik leadership as well as the 
well-attested fact of the revision and modification of the ideology to suit the political 
needs of the moment,
54
 suggest that the Bolshevik experience is as much a product of 
their time and their circumstances. More insightful are the accounts that assumed a 
mutual interaction between ideology and realpolitik or experience in Communism.
55
 
The possibility of this interaction in Communism was allowed, it can be assumed, by 
the fact that Bolshevik and Soviet ideology was strongly orientated towards action.
56
 
The authors who proposed this model, however, often failed to give a more 
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sophisticated account of how the ideology, interests, and experience actually interacted 
in the concrete process generation of policy.                                                   
Instead of the aforementioned model of the interaction between ideology and 
experience, this dissertation proposes a model of mutual constitution, in which ideology 
and experience are not only interactively involved in the generation of policy and 
political action, but also exert an influence upon each other and mutually shape their 
content, mediated through the notion of perception. A methodology which assumes a 
dichotomy between ideology and experience, and seeks to identify the ways in which 
these two elements compete for authority in the generation of policy and political 
action, it is contended here, is in risk of imposing upon reality a conceptual framework 
that dilutes its actual dynamics. The assessment of political experiences shows —and 
this will be illustrated throughout this dissertation— that both ideology and experience 
operated simultaneously in the definition of political action, and not as separately as it is 
assumed in traditional models. 
The ideology, especially when it is highly articulated, comprehensive and all-
demanding —as in the case of Bolshevism— imposes a filter or tunnel-vision that 
affects the way in which experience is perceived. The effect of experience and interests 
in political action is then, often mediated by the ideological lenses, which determine 
what a given fact means for an agent in the language of his/her own ideological 
universe. Thus the constitution of experience in the mind of the agent is mediated by the 
ideology. In turn, the relation between the agent and the ideology is mediated by 
experience, which determines the aspects of the ideology that are emphasized or 
deemphasized, confirmed or denied, reorganized or dissolved. The constitution of the 
ideology, hence, is also shaped by experience, and ideological evolution and historical 
factors are by this process dynamically intermingled. 
Employing this model, this dissertation argues that the ‘militarisation’ of 
Marxism that took place in Bolshevism was the product of both Bolshevik ideology and 
historical experience, but not by a sum of these factors, nor by the separate effect of 
them, but by a mutual constitution. It was a product of Lenin’s revolutionary theory as 
much as was a product of Tsarism, the First World War, and the Civil War. But it was 
the Bolshevik ideological perception of these events that was crucial, since it 
emphasized the elements of their ideology which pointed towards militarisation. But 
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these ideological elements could not have been emphasised in absence of these events. 
The constructivist scholarship, as developed principally in international relations, could 
be invoked in support of this model, inasmuch as it has shown how the processes of 
perception shape the way in which agents understand themselves and the world, how 
ideas influence perception, and how perception shapes the definition of interests, and 
hence, of policy, and has thus overcome the one-sidedness of realist and liberal 
accounts.
57
   
 
 
b) Visions of History and War 
 
This dissertation argues likewise that the Bolshevism’s view of history had a significant 
role in shaping its attitude and outlook towards war. This is, of course, not a surprising 
and original statement per se. It is a truism that the Bolshevik judged things and events 
‘by whether it served to turn the wheel of history forwards or backwards.’58 
Nevertheless, it is contended here that when this argument is made, in most cases, it is 
often based on a simplistic understanding of the Bolsheviks’ relation to history that 
imposes a conceptual framework into reality, rather than deriving the former from the 
latter. The dominant view is that the Bolsheviks were totally convinced of the 
inevitability of the advent of Communism, of the triumph of their revolution, and that 
they acted according to all the patterns that are implied in such belief. A typical 
statement is found in François Furet, who argued that Communism was some sort of 
illusion that prevented the correction that comes from experience, and a deification of 
history.
59
 Even a very recent scholarly collection takes the belief in the inevitability of 
Communism in Bolshevism as a general assumption.
60
 
More sophisticated accounts of this problem, of course, have been elaborated by 
a number of scholars. Neil Harding provided a framework for the interpretation of 
Lenin’s thought that explained it not in terms of a blind belief in the inevitability of 
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Communism, but rather in terms of careful study of the present through the lenses of a 
Marxist teleology of history. For Lenin, he wrote: ‘[e]ach phase was significant and 
important only insofar as it contributed to the final denouement [...] the key element of 
his thought was a dialectical teleology.’61 Political action was, then, deduced from a 
correlation between the study of the facts and the expectation of the fulfilment of a pre-
established theoretical model of history.  Nonetheless, in the view of the author, 
Harding’s assumption cannot explain entirely the Bolshevik modus operandi in such 
fateful events as Bloody Sunday and First World War, what Lenin called ‘revolutionary 
times’ or ‘revolutionary moments’, because it did not explore fully how that view 
affected Bolshevik outlook in these conjunctures. It is within these contexts, it is argued 
here, that the influence of Bolshevik teleology became particularly pronounced in their 
political action, particularly in relation to the issue of war.    
But, what did this teleology consist in? The teleological undertones of Marxism 
and Bolshevism are certainly well established. Nevertheless, the arguments that suggest 
that the Bolsheviks acted with the consciousness of having ‘history’ on their side, 
entirely sure of their final victory, must be qualified. Soviet propaganda at the time of 
Stalin and Khrushchev presented a version that is similar to that: Marxism-Leninism 
had ‘scientifically’ discovered the true ‘laws of history’, and this factor assured the 
invincibility of socialism and its imminent world triumph.
62
 Nevertheless, the sources 
suggest that the actual understanding and the teleological orientation in both Marxism 
and Bolshevism had different orientation. Notwithstanding their claims on the 
imminence of Communism, Marx and Engels left no concrete and specific route to 
arrive at that historical point, and demonstrated awareness that revolutionary processes 
might fail and collapse,
63
 if certain conditions are not met, as Engels’ text on the 
European War showed.  
Bolshevik texts also suggest that the most important leaders of the movement 
did not believe that the triumph of their revolution was inevitable. Speaking in the 
aftermath of Bloody Sunday (1905), when it was widely believed that a revolutionary 
moment had arrived in Russian and that the monarchy would be soon replaced by a 
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bourgeois democratic government, Lenin argued that the question of whether an armed 
uprising of the people was inevitable was irrelevant, and that what mattered was simply 
that it was  necessary,
64
 and refused to be overly optimistic about the possibility of 
victory, stating simply that there at least some tendencies that made it possible.
65
 He did 
not manifest any view that the revolution would necessarily succeed. When he has 
already achieved his revolution, he did not express that such event had been inevitable, 
but rather that it has been a ‘miracle’ —not, of course, of a divine kind— because they 
could stand firm in war against ‘the whole world’ for three years and to emerge 
victorious from it.
66
 
  Bolshevik teleology, as Harding argued in the case of Lenin,
67
 was teleology of 
development in which historical economic and political processes were scrutinized to 
determine their progressive potential, and political action was ordered to prepare the 
context for the advent of the new historical phase when such potential was at its fullest 
level. Bolshevik historical reason, then, was not a mechanistic reading of history in 
which predetermined historical scenarios were simply to be discovered or reached at 
given conjunctures, but rather a constant search to meet the historical conditions with 
the right revolutionary activity to foster historical development. In other words, what 
mattered for the Bolsheviks in those moments that they called ‘revolutionary’ —
namely, the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, and the context of First World War— was not 
that a given historical order was arriving in these circumstances, but rather that what 
they took as the most necessary conditions for revolution were present in them.  
This dissertation argues, thus, that what was crucial for the Bolshevik view of 
war was not the belief that Communism was inevitable, but rather, the belief that with 
First World War the proper time for their revolution had arrived, that that was their 
time, that they should make their revolution at that moment for no other moment could 
arrive in the future, and that militarisation was needed for that purpose. This belief took 
a form similar to that of the Greek concept of ‘kairos’, which meant ‘the right moment’, 
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or ‘the opportune moment.’ 68 This belief is to be distinguished from pure realpolitik —
in which circumstances are assessed and the best advantage is taken out of them— 
inasmuch as it imposes upon the judgement of the agent a meta-historical necessity for 
political action in a given scenario. The factor was not so much that the conditions were 
there, but that they believed that they were there for a passing moment, and that they 
could lose everything if they missed them.  
Thus, unlike Harding, who argued for a steady correlation between the study of 
the present conditions, strategy, and developmental teleology in Lenin’s thought, this 
dissertation argues that the Bolshevik view of history leads to points in which the 
teleological factor becomes dominant and imposes upon strategy the necessity of 
intensive activity, a point in which the conditions for progressive action become critical 
and demand the utmost sacrifices, the payment of all costs, and the most resolute efforts 
to achieve the objectives. These points are the ‘revolutionary moments’, the instant of 
time in which a Revolution is possible, that might not come again, and thus collapses 
strategy into fast, risky, all-cost, and all-effort action. The concrete implications of this 
factor for the Bolshevik view of war are set forth below.   
    
 
c) The Eschatological Approach to War 
 
Anatol Rapoport distinguished between three major philosophies of war: the 
cataclysmic, the political, and the eschatological. The cataclysmic, which is 
symbolically represented by Lev Tolstoi, understands war as irrational and purposeless, 
but having deep and lasting consequences for humanity; the political, which is 
represented by Clausewitz, sees war as a normalised instrument of the national state to 
achieve a definite set of objectives —which might be either ethically permissible or not; 
and the eschatological,
69
 which sees war —or a determinate war— as the violent 
culmination of a historical process, which is ordained to given origin to a radically 
renewed historical order. He summarised this schema by stating that ‘in political 
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philosophy war is compared to a game of strategy (like chess); in eschatological 
philosophy, to a mission or the dénouement of a drama; in cataclysmic philosophy, to a 
fire or an epidemic.’ And he places Marx and Lenin in the eschatological tradition.70   
Rapoport essentially departed from the common interpretation of the Bolshevik 
approach to war, the core of which has been constantly seen as deeply influenced by 
Clausewitz’s theories, a tendency which in turn can be understood as the consequence 
of taking Lenin’s continuous praises to him as indicative of the authentic character of 
his own view of war. Vigor exemplifies this common view by stating that ‘[...] though 
Clausewitz was not, of course, a Marxist, a great deal of thought is inherently congenial 
to Marxism; and he is accepted by Marxism-Leninism as one of its prime authorities on 
war.’71 Werner Hahlweg had stated the same before him: ‘Lenin incorporated 
Clausewitz’s basic thoughts into the Marxist Leninist system, which can no longer be 
imagined without them.’72 Jacob Kipp likewise argued that ‘Lenin’s reading of 
Clausewitz assumed central significance with the increasing militarization of Lenin’s 
thought [...].’73  
The extent to which Lenin actually relied on Clausewitz will be explored in the 
second chapter. It should be stated here, simply, that associating Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks with the Clausewitzian tradition might significantly blur the revolutionary 
undertones of the ideology and practice of the former. This dissertation argues that the 
Bolshevik military ideas and praxis during their most important political events, and 
particularly during the Russian Revolution, cannot be accurately understood in 
Clausewitz’s sense of war as a tool of policy for the normal objectives of a nation state. 
Simply stated, the warfare of the Bolsheviks was, within the framework of their own 
ideological universe, a revolutionary warfare. Inasmuch as the Clausewitzian model 
does not possess revolutionary aspects in any sense,
74
 it is incapable to account for the 
ideological structure and main implications of Bolshevik warfare.  
Rapoport’s classification of the Bolshevik approach to war as ‘eschatological’ is, 
in view of the author of this dissertation, more accurate than the common view referred 
to above. Nonetheless, not being a specialist on Bolshevism, Rapoport’s interpretation 
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of the Bolshevik view falls into the simplistic understanding of Marxism and 
Bolshevism described in the previous section. Moreover, he fails to make proper and 
necessary distinctions, such as that between revolution and war, and presents many 
concepts in a level of generalisation that seems to be required for his classification but 
which cannot express the features of Bolshevism in their proper particularity. Thus, this 
dissertation takes his main assumption, but seeks to move to a more accurate 
understanding of the specificities of Bolshevism, and to develop the implications of this 
‘eschatological’ reading of the Bolshevik view of war.  
In the perspective of the author of this dissertation, there are at least four 
characteristics of an approach to war that can be considered ‘eschatological’: firstly, 
significant threat: the context in which warfare takes place is perceived as threatening 
the existence and purpose of the group; absolute promise: the context offers the only 
opportunity to achieve the proper objectives of the group; historical uniqueness: the 
opportunity to achieve the objectives is perceived as unique and unlikely to happen 
again; definitive struggle: the war is perceived as the last war, the war that would put 
end to all wars; violent pathway: the context forces the group the resort to war to 
achieve their objectives, for only through it can survive violence, and this is justified 
inasmuch as these objectives will abolish war altogether.      
It is the general contention of this work that the interpretation of many events of 
the time —imperialism, militarism, the arms race, but principally the onset of First 
World War— in Bolshevism, led the main  leaders of the movement —particularly 
Lenin— to the belief a critical point had been reached, in which their Revolution was 
truly possible but at the same time radically threatened, a point which might not come in 
the future, and hence should be taken advantage of then or missed altogether. The 
promise was a World Revolution that would quickly spread throughout the globe and 
totally abolish war by uprooting the class division that were its true cause. But in the 
context of war, survival and success of the movement could be achieved only through 
war: war would be abolished through war. This, it is argued here, explains the 
‘militarisation of Marxism’.    
It is only when the Bolsheviks realised that their Revolution did not happen, that 
the threat was not absolute, that their opportunity was not unique, and that the Great 
European War was not to be the last war, that he moved from an ‘eschatological’ to a 
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more ‘political’ understanding. Freed from the demands of the ‘revolutionary moment’ 
of which Lenin had convinced himself, Stalinist and Soviet warfare in general adopted 
contours more similar to the Clausewitzian view of war as instrument for the purposes 
of the state, albeit preserving the rhetoric and warfare concepts inherit from the 
‘revolutionary’ generation. The absence of the aforementioned process among European 
socialists explains, in turn, why their analyses of the situation of the time differed from 
Lenin’s. The next three chapters illustrate how this interpretation is supported in the 
facts. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOCIALISM AND WAR IN THE 19TH CENTURY 
 
 
This chapter describes the broad intellectual context in which the Bolshevik approach to 
war developed. It presents, initially, the main conditions and aspects of modern warfare, 
and the philosophical and theoretical traditions that emerged in response to them. It later 
presents a general introduction to the views of war in socialism, and finally and 
assessment of the views of war of Marx and Engels. The first and second sections will 
allow appreciating the background against which Bolshevism emerged, and to compare 
and contrasts the latter with alternative traditions of war. This comparison will serve to 
support some arguments of this dissertation. The third section allows assessing the 
relation, as far as the political aspects of war are concerned, between Bolshevism and 
the authors whom they took as their canonical authorities. 
 
 
Traditions of War  
 
Warfare was profoundly transformed in modernity by many factors, particularly the rise 
of the national states, the formation of professional armies, and technological 
advancement. Throughout the Middle Ages, changes in the technology of warfare and in 
the methods of fighting were not significant,
75
 and the character of war remained 
relatively static, if compared with the changes of modernity. Canonical and civil law 
regulated the exercise of war according to principles of the ‘just war’ tradition as 
formulated by Augustine of Hippo and developed by moral theologians. The armies 
involved had personal allegiance to the ruler rather than to the community as a whole, 
and their allegiance could be negotiated and changed. From the 16th century onwards, 
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there would be a tendency to substitute mercenary armies by citizen militias, and to 
move the allegiance from the ruler and dynasty to the state. 
These changes emerged progressively between the 16th and 17th centuries in a 
process that has been called the ‘military revolution’,76 the decisive fact of which was 
the development of firearms. Traditional chivalry, which stood at the heart of warfare 
for many centuries, would be turned obsolete by the new arms, and radical changes in 
terms of strategy and operation would be made necessary. Military thought had taken 
inspiration from Ancient Rome’s warfare,77 but in this period it would be forced to 
rethink its own presuppositions and fundamental principles. These transformations 
notwithstanding, and perhaps with the exception of the wars of religion, the warfare that 
emerged was characterised by limited mobilisation and ideological commitment. 
Firearms forced a retreat from all-out warfare and open military clash, and strengthened 
manoeuvre and politics. As Azar Gat has pointed out, in the period from 1648 —the 
symbolic year of the emergence of the national state— to the French Revolution, most 
wars were limited and rather conservative in objectives.
78
 
The French Revolution and later on the Napoleonic campaigns, in turn, would 
provoke radical changes in the visions and practice of warfare. Along with French 
Revolution, national armies with a definite ideological commitment to a community and 
intense level of popular involvement and mobilization emerged. National mass armies 
replaced the old armies of professional fighters. Napoleon demolished the manoeuvre 
warfare of the Ancien Regime that sought to provoke the retreat of the enemy by 
strategic moves or politics, and put in its place an all-out warfare based in the total 
concentration of forces, the open military clash, and the destruction of the enemy. The 
two events, in sum, implied a change from the predominance of limited war and 
manoeuvre to ‘total’ war, a configuration that will predominate throughout the 19th 
century and until First World War. 
It was in response to the many concerns imposed by these historical facts that 
the modern philosophical and theoretical traditions on war developed. Philosophers who 
debated on war generally gravitated around series of major topics, the most important of 
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which probably were the causes of war, the possibility of abolition of war, the 
rationality/irrationality of war, the relation between ‘total’ and ‘absolute’ wars and 
‘limited war’, and the permissibility of war.  One of these traditions, which might be 
called the ‘realist’ view, and which is symbolically represented by Machiavelli and 
Thucydides, perceived war as a normalised feature of the human experience, and saw 
history as an endless alternation between peace and war.
79
 The task of the philosophers 
was conceived as devising forms of limiting and rationalising the exercise of wars and 
preventing escalation. Causes of war were attributed either to human nature, or the laws 
of history, and the possibility of its abolition was thus dismissed.  
The predominance of limited warfare and the constraints imposed by manoeuvre 
and politics on warfare seem to have contributed to ‘realist’ accounts of war. Another 
tradition, which might be called —albeit anachronistically— ‘liberal’, postulated that it 
was possible to significantly limit war or to abolish it altogether, be it through the 
formation of a big world empire, or a system of balance of power, or through a 
confederation. Canonical authors associated with this tradition include Kant, Rousseau, 
and Abbé Saint Pierre, all of whom seemed to be concerned with the devastation 
produced by the wars of religion. Some of these authors connected war with political 
structures, and preached the promotion democracy or republicanism as antidote.  
Another relevant tradition comes from the Enlightenment, which in keeping with 
its own principles and aims, sought to discover the universal laws of war that, so they 
assumed, would explain all wars from all ages, and will help to subject the participation 
to the dominion of rationality.
80
 As in other disciplines, Enlightenment military thinkers 
were fascinated by the precision of natural sciences, and were interested in applying 
mathematical models to warfare. Their ideal was to manoeuvre as to force a retreat of 
the enemy and prevent full-scale war. These theories were discredited with Napoleon’s 
demolition of war of manoeuvre. Believing that Napoleon had revealed the true general 
principle of war, the so-called German military school emerged as a reaction to the 
Enlightenment, and insisted in the historicity, particularity, and the multiplicity of 
factors of each war, and the role of experience.  
The rise of Clausewitz within the German military school overshadowed the 
Enlightenment and German thinkers, and most other philosophers of war ever since, 
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rivalled perhaps, in the pure philosophical plane, only by Lev Tolstoy. Clausewitz 
derived from the Napoleonic experience the idea of all-out war, open military 
engagement, and total destruction of the enemy as the inherent tendency of war, but a 
tendency that was limited by the influence of politics.
81
 Lev Tolstoy was to some extent 
also a reaction to the Enlightenment, but from a different angle. Against the 
Enlightenment belief in the possibility of subjecting war to reason, Tolstoy insisted in 
the incommensurable number of factors involved in war, its unpredictability, and the 
deceptiveness of military history that made appear that most facts of war were the result 
decisions of generals alone.     
  Most of these traditions shared the assumption that it was possible to argue 
morally about war, and to judge the motivations and outcomes of each particular war 
according to ethical principles. The tradition that rejected this assumption was pacifism, 
which was based in a condemnation of war without reservation, and which had 
philosophical roots in utopian, anarchist, and religious roots. The French Revolution 
also gave origin to another relevant approach: that which understood war as a tool of the 
oppressed for liberation, for emancipation from despotic rule.
82
 This tradition 
introduced a strong dichotomy between wars unleashed by monarchs and those fought 
by oppressed nations, and challenged the notion of aggressive/defensive war distinction, 
for aggressiveness was understood to be rooted not in the opening of military hostilities 
but rather in the structure of long-term oppression.  
 
 
Socialism and War 
 
The general attitude of socialism —broadly conceived— towards war has been 
accurately portrayed by E.H. Carr: 
 
[…] war was the necessary consequence of capitalism. National wars 
were waged at the behest of capitalists and for their advantage. The 
coming of socialism would remove the fundamental cause of war and its 
sole incentive. […] The socialist tradition always embodied a strong 
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element of opposition to war, based on a specific interest of the workers 
in the maintenance of peace; it thus ran parallel to the liberal tradition of 
the later nineteenth century which attributed war to autocratic 
government […].83   
 
Despite their manifold divisions, the various traditions of socialism shared, thus, a more 
or less general agreement in most of the issues that concerned philosophers. The causes 
of war and the possibility of its abolition were clear for them. War was a disastrous 
event, but could be explained in terms of a grand underlying factor. National wars, 
unleashed for the interests of the rulers, should not concern the workers who shared a 
solidarity among them that knew no borders. But the translation of these general ideas 
into practice proved to be tragically contentious. Socialists had different and often 
conflicting understandings of what the position of the workers in face of existing 
military conflict should be, of what strategy should be followed by the socialists parties 
in the time of war, and what was the role of war in the historical process towards 
socialism.  
In the classical ‘just war’ theory, wars were judged according to their origin and 
their purpose: wars of aggression are judged as immoral, and defensive wars as just. 
The socialists preserved this level of analysis, but many of them sought to modify their 
content, according to their own principles, and to move beyond the aggressive/defensive 
distinction, which Karl Kautsky deemed as ‘outdated’.84 This has as a primary purpose 
to support and legitimise the wars of national liberation and anti-colonial wars, which in 
many cases had started as a result of an initial uprising of the subjected people. 
Nevertheless, the classical theory was not totally rejected, and served as a lingua franca 
to criticise aggressive militaristic campaigns, and ended up in a rather uneasy and 
imprecise position within the European socialist intellectual universe.     
To this first level of analysis —wars judged according to their origins and 
purposes— many socialists added two more levels, namely, one in terms of global 
historical effects of war —whether a given war was ‘reactionary’ or ‘progressive’, 
whether it turned the clock of history forward or backward— and the other in terms of 
the opportunities brought by war for the cause of socialism —whether a determinate 
                                               
83
 E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. III,. 550. 
84
 Georges Haupt, Socialism and the Great War, 25. 
 44 
 
war could provide the necessary context for a national transition to socialism. 
Nevertheless, the relation between war and the transition towards socialism, as well as 
the position of socialism towards existing wars never received an answer that was 
acceptable for the various socialist leaders. Marx and Engels, as it will be shown below, 
emphasised the second level of analysis. The European socialists in the eve of the war 
eventually ended in some form of the first level, whereas the Bolsheviks turned entirely 
towards the third level of analysis. 
The socialist critique, however, was essentially directed towards economic and 
social aspects, and the issue of war was just a derivative aspect of that, for them. It was 
the force of the circumstances, the increasing awareness of the intermingling of military, 
social, and economic aspects, and the profound impact that the crudest wars of the time 
had in domestic and international politics, that led the socialists to focus in the issue of 
war.
85
 The definition of the stance of the worldwide worker movement in face of the 
military conflicts that afflicted Europe was a controversial issue since the time of the 
First International Socialists. Discussions on disarmament, pacifism, and the workers’ 
course of action in relation to the conflicts in which their countries were involved, were 
object of strong disputes, particularly among Marx and Engels, and the proponents of 
pacifism that took their inspiration from the writings of Pierre Joseph Proudhon. 
  Despite their condemnation of war and contempt of militarism, Marx and Engels 
strongly clashed with the pacifists and those who argued in favour of disarmament for, 
in their view, any plan to eradicate war besides that of constructing socialism would be 
inevitably destined to fail. Disarmament only would leave the workers defenceless,
86
 
and every war contains the seeds of new wars, he argued. Marx and Engels ultimately 
distanced themselves from classical theories by dismissing the distinction between 
aggressive and defensive wars as ‘illusory’.87 These divergences were not solved during 
Marx and Engels’ life, and were inherited by the Second International. As Karl Kautsky 
argued in 1907, socialists seemed to agree in the condemnation of war only, but 
disagreed in most other things.
88
 Marx and Engels’ works would eventually become 
canonical for a large number of socialists, and many of them would look at these works 
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in their disputes, in order to find support for their own ideas —Kautsky and Lenin, 
principally. In Marx and Engels could be found, thus, not only the source of most 
dominant socialist ideas on war, but also the source of their most fateful disagreements.    
 
 
Marx and Engels on War 
 
Marx and Engels could not provide the socialists who looked back at them for guidance 
in topics connected with war with substantive answers to most questions, since they did 
not leave any systematic treatment on war and peace for posterity, and their ideas were 
scattered throughout in their various writings. 
89
 Their ideas were expressed with clarity 
in many instances, but it is necessary to extract them from the particular argumentative 
context in which they were framed to derive general principles that are valid for other 
contexts. In the other hand, the way in which they both addressed the topic of the 
relation between the socialist revolution and war is not entirely consistent. As the 
philosopher W.B. Gallie pointed out, war is treated in their writings variously as a 
stumbling block for the workers’ movement that might be either surmountable or might 
threaten it entirely, a catalyst for the revolution, an accelerator of the decadence of old 
reactionary institutions, and even a tool for revolution.
90
 These inconsistencies are, 
understandably, at the root of many disagreements among their followers.  
The main tendencies in Marx and Engels’ writings on war, as illustrated by their 
interventions in the controversies of the First International, can be summarized as 
follows: first, war is the consequence of the division of classes and, hence, capitalism is 
the cause of modern warfare; second, only the advent of socialism will eradicate war 
and bring a perpetual peace, and before that event war is unavoidable and any peace is 
temporary and limited; third, a particular war should be judged both by the purpose of 
its agents and by its consequences, the two first dimensions mentioned at the beginning 
of the first chapter : (a) in the first case, wars are ‘just’ and ‘progressive’ for the 
oppressed nations which fight against their oppressive landlords and colonizers, and 
‘unjust’ and ‘reactionary’ for the imperialist nations that wage them for the sake of 
territorial expansion, plunder, colonization, and so forth; (b) and in the second case, 
                                               
89
 Peter Vigor, The Soviet View of War, 240. 
90
 W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, 72.  
 46 
 
wars whose consequences helps the historical progress toward socialism are to be 
supported, and those that obstruct it are to be opposed.
91
 
It was the judgement of war through its consequences, nonetheless, that 
constituted the most distinctive aspect of Marx and Engels’s approach to war and peace, 
and this aspect show how theory was deeply attached to practical considerations in 
Marxist ideology. They maintained that, if the expected consequences of the triumph of 
one party were beneficial for the proletarian revolution, that party should be supported, 
even if it were the case of a war between two bourgeois countries. In the Franco-
Prussian war, for instance, they decided to support Prussia, believing that its triumph 
would help the worker movement both in France and Germany
92
. Marx had sustained 
that wars ‘put nations to the test’ and destroyed institutions that had become obsolete 
and backward and, hence, its effects could provide a very favourable backdrop from the 
emergence of the socialist revolution.
93
 Lenin absorbed these general Marxist principles, 
including the consequentialist judgement of war, and built upon them a general theory 
that eventually succeeded as the dominant position of the Bolshevik Party. 
What, then, proved to be divisive for socialists in this canonical corpus? The 
divisions of the socialists over the issue of war has attracted the attention of many 
writers, but in the estimation of the author of this dissertation is the merit of the W.B. 
Gallie in having provided the most convincing solution. He attributed these divisions to 
confusions generated by Engels’ late writings.94 During the last years of his life, and 
after the death of Karl Marx, the topic of war seem to have been a special preoccupation 
for Engels, and were his writings from that period, and not the early works produced in 
collaboration with Marx that had the strongest impact in the socialist outlook of war, 
although this has been greatly overlooked.
95
 Some authors, such as Peter Vigor, have 
noticed that war was more a concern for Engels than for Marx, but fail to explore the 
content and implications of Engels’s late writings, in part because these are often 
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considered to be focused in technical and strategic aspects, and not the political 
dimension of war.
96
   
Certainly, Engels’ late writings dug into several technical and strategic aspects 
that never concerned Marx, but they touch many political and theoretical aspects too, 
particularly the concrete relation between revolution and war. It is no fortuity, then, that 
it is to Engels and not to Marx that Lenin made reference when addressing the topic of 
war, and it was Engels who was hailed in the Soviet Union as the great founder of the 
Communist theory of war.
97
 Engels argued that the replacement of professional armies 
for national armies and military conscriptions was highly beneficial for the revolution, 
inasmuch as it allowed socialist workers to penetrate the army, and military effectives 
would be more reachable and convertible to the cause. Hence, the army could be 
employed as a tool for the transition towards socialism. The socialists should, then, 
work for disarmament and the establishment of citizen militias.
98 
Which concrete role 
these socialist armies should have, however, was not clear.  
  Engels’ estimations of the outcomes of militarism and of a —by then— probable 
great European war appear to have been influential in shaping the socialist outlook on 
work, although, in the opinion of the author of this dissertation, many writers seem to 
have failed to grasp their full impact and implications. As a few authors in his time, 
Engels foresaw the unprecedented violence that would be unleashed in a general 
European war, but proposed two senses in which they it might affect the world socialist 
movement: it would destroy it altogether, or demolish all its achievements along with its 
prospects of success, or it would provide the conditions for its triumph. The first sense 
was expressed in an 1882 letter to Bebel and an 1888 letter to Storge. He wrote to Bebel 
that, should a European war take place, ‘[a]ll the work of the revolutionaries in Russia 
would be rendered useless; our party in Germany would be swamped and ruined [...] 
and it would be the same in France.’99 In another 1888 work he wrote, in contrast: ‘only 
one result [of the war] is absolutely certain: general exhaustion and the establishment of 
the conditions for the ultimate victory of the working class.’100       
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These two views —that the popular militias should be converted to the socialist 
cause, and that a great European war would cause either the utter destruction or ultimate 
victory of the workers— were decisive in shaping, albeit in different form, the approach 
to war and revolution of the European socialists and of Bolshevism, and was at the root 
of their bitter disagreements in 1914, as Gallie noted. How this process took place 
would be explained later, following the general lines established by the British 
philosopher. This dissertation goes beyond him by arguing that the second ideas was 
more relevant for Bolshevism, and shaped decisively its outlook. It provided with their 
ultimate threat and their ultimate opportunity. But for now, it is convenient to take a 
look at the intellectual origins of the Bolshevik approach to war. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
WAR AND THE FAILED REVOLUTION 
 
 
There were three contexts in which the Bolsheviks were forced to give strong 
consideration to the political and strategic aspects of war: (a) Bloody Sunday and the 
1905 Revolution, (b) the onset of First World War, and (c) the Russian Civil War. 
During the period following the 1905 Revolution until the Great War, the topic was 
naturally not among their main concerns, and this is, of course, reflected in their 
writings,
101
 except for the Stuttgart Congress which will be referred to in the next 
chapter. The most significant difference between the first two contexts and the last is 
that after the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks were in position of controlling an 
army and to unleash and get involved in military conflicts, and this factor shaped their 
general outlook.
102
 This chapter focuses in the first of these contexts, and the other two 
are addressed in the fifth and sixth chapters, respectively. The content that follows 
covers the ideological and historical origins of the Bolshevik approach to war.     
 
 
The Party as an Army 
 
The Bolsheviks, as is well known, were the result of the split of the Russian Social 
Democratic Labour Party in 1903. The main point of dispute between the two resulting 
wings —the Bolsheviks, dominated by Vladimir Lenin’s protagonist role, and the 
Mensheviks, under the leadership of Julius Martov— was Lenin’s plan of a centralised 
party of professional revolutionaries.
103
 In the years preceding this event, the activity of 
the socialists in Russia had been mostly confined to intellectual affairs. The young 
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Lenin rose to prominence among the socialists as a fierce opponent of the Russian 
populists or narodniki, a group which argued that the peasant commune was the 
pathway to socialism. Along with Georgi Plekhanov —a senior Russian Marxist whom 
was to become later his opponent— Lenin’s main task was to attack the populists and to 
prove them that the it was the proletariat, and not the peasantry, that was capable of 
leading the revolution, and that the peasant commune generated rather than prevented 
capitalism.
104
      
By the time of the split, Lenin’s main concern was to raise the ‘revolutionary 
consciousness’ of the proletariat, namely, to help the workers to be aware of their 
condition as a class, and of their revolutionary potential, and his activity, consequently, 
was focused in the organisation of the centralised elite party that he needed for that 
purpose. His intentions put him in contention with other groups of socialists, 
particularly those who became known as the ‘economists’ and the ‘terrorists’: the latter 
wanted a strategy based on the improvement of the economic situation of the workers, 
whereas the former preached an open violent confrontation with the monarchy. Lenin 
thought that the economists’ and the terrorists’ methods were ineffective and prevented 
the revolutionary development of the proletariat. Two of his most famous early works: 
‘Where to Begin?’ (1901) and ‘What is to be done?’ (1902), are in substance an attack 
of both the economists and the terrorists.
105
     
Although this debate is not directly related to the question of war, it is possible 
to contemplate in it some elements that are indicative of what Lenin thought in the 
subject at this point. It is also opportune to compare Lenin’s strategy at this point with 
his strategy in 1905. The first thing that is noticeable in these early writings is that 
Lenin constantly employed military metaphors, terminology and symbols to refer to the 
group that he wanted to organise. The Russian students of Marxism were, for him, for 
instance, like ‘new warriors’ seeking to ‘take the field against the enemy’,106 and he 
could call them as ‘our military forces [...] of volunteers and insurgents’.107 Terror is 
defined by him as a ‘military action’ suitable for specific conditions. He did not reject it 
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on principle, but he thought that it was unsuitable for the socialists at that point, as it 
might have ended up dispersing the group and weakening its capacity of action.
108
  
The military language consists mostly of metaphors of political action, but it is 
not clear how he understood the relation between civil war and revolution at this point. 
His argument against the terrorists, who for the most part belonged to the group that 
became known as the Social Revolutionaries,
109
 is not that a direct assault was incorrect, 
but rather that it was imprudent. The objective of What is to Done?, he wrote, was to 
reject ‘an immediate call for assault’ and to demand that ‘all efforts be directed towards 
gathering, organising, and mobilising a permanent army’.110 In Lenin’s Where to 
begin?, nevertheless, the claim is made that tsardom will probably not fall as a result of 
a ‘regular siege or organized assault only’ and that such a view is ‘absurd and 
doctrinaire’, and that it will most likely fall as a result of ‘spontaneous outbursts and 
unforeseen political complications which constantly threaten it from all sides.’111 
The influence of Engels is revealed in a footnote where Lenin calls for taking 
advantage of the discontent among the military to gain their effectives to socialism, and 
to have ‘military organisations’ affiliated to the party,112 though still not clear how he 
imagines their role. Be as it may, Lenin’s analogies between political action and warfare 
might suggest bellicose tendency in his personality, and might give some credibility to 
the theories that rooted his later militarism and ruthlessness in his personal traits. But it 
is interesting to note, nevertheless, that at this point Lenin’s military imagination seems 
to possess exactly the opposite features of Clausewitzian warfare. Clausewitz’s 
conception of war was based in the Napoleonic strategy of open and direct engagement, 
maximum concentration of forces, and total destruction,
113
 which is the kind of action 
that Lenin is reproaching to the terrorists. Lenin’s military configuration is more akin to 
the manoeuvre warfare against which Clausewitz was reacting.   
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The Revolutionary Momentum of 1905 
 
In 1902, radicals argued that Lenin’s gradual strategy put the socialists in risk of 
‘missing’ the Revolution, a claim dismissed by Lenin.114 By 1905, after the massacre 
perpetrated by the monarchy against a peaceful demonstration of peasants, and which 
sparked a chain of national uprisings, Lenin’s position had been inverted and he was 
anxious about the possibility of missing the revolutionary moment. His tone and mood 
became extremely bellicose and warlike, but in this time the military language was not 
employed as a metaphor for political action: it embodied a genuine call for armed 
uprising of the people. The objective of the socialists was to overthrow the monarchy 
and to establish a bourgeois democratic regime. Lenin thought that the only suitable 
pathway for that outcome was an armed uprising that would provoke a civil war. In his 
Revolutionary Days, written from Geneva, he argued that the workers had learnt from 
the massacre that they were already in a war, and they must respond accordingly. 
‘Revolution is war’, he said, and ‘[o]f all the wars fought in history it is the only lawful, 
rightful, just, and truly Great War. […]. 115  
The article of the same year entitled The Revolutionary Army and the 
Revolutionary Government contains a first sketch of what later would become Lenin’s 
mature theory of war. Civil war, in his view, would be a ‘higher form of revolutionary 
struggle’ into which the workers were introduced after experiencing repeatedly military 
brutal repression from the hands of the tsarist government.
116
 Civil war is connected to 
the proletarian revolution as a necessary pathway, since ‘exploitation cannot be 
destroyed without war’, and the workers are compelled to wars that are ‘always and 
everywhere begun by the exploiters themselves’.117 The aim of the article was to 
convince the forces of the popular opposition to organize in the form of a revolutionary 
army’, and this purpose also animated another article entitled From the Defensive to the 
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Offensive, but with a tone much more bellicose, since Lenin explicitly calls for the 
large-scale production of bombs for the use of this revolutionary army 
118
 
The strategy of ‘What is to be Done?’ was then turned upside down. There was 
no more need for cultivating the ‘revolutionary consciousness’ of the proletariat, 
because that could be gained in the revolutionary practice of the direct assault. Lenin 
now debated with the Mensheviks, who did not totally reject the armed uprising, but 
were more cautious and wanted to negotiate their place as opposition in a possible 
Constituent Assembly. Lenin accused them of seeking a deadly compromise with the 
monarchy. His plan was to arm the people for the overthrow of the Tsar, and to 
subsequently form of transitional government, a dictatorship, that would prevent the 
bourgeoisie from taking advantage of the revolutionary gains of the workers:  
 
 A decisive victory of revolution over tsarism’ is the revolutionary-
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. […] And 
such a victory will be precisely a dictatorship, i.e., it must inevitably rely 
on military force, on the arming of the masses, on an insurrection, and 
not on institutions of one kind of another, established in a “lawful” or 
“peaceful” way.119  
  
Lenin writings reveal a careful attention of the past, and the need to learn from past 
experiences the necessary lessons. In this, at least, he approached Clausewitz. He 
considered —with a bit of precision— that the Bolsheviks were like the Jacobins, and 
the Mensheviks like the Girondins. But it was the crushing of the 1848 German 
Revolution that was more relevant, since it showed that the big mistake had been the 
passivity of the revolutionaries and their refusal to start an armed uprising. He 
accompanied this with a rather crude apology for violence, stating that ‘force alone 
settles the great problems of political liberty and the class struggle’, and that the action 
of the counter-revolution was the measure of the reaction of the revolution. He reiterates 
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Engels’ hopes that the popular members of the military might be attracted by the 
socialist cause and become aware of the exploitation of the people by the monarchy.
120
  
Two ideas that would become essential part of the Bolshevik outlook on war are 
clearly delineated in the writings of this time: the notion that counter-revolution will 
always be strong, and indefatigable, and hence there was a need to totally crush it, and 
notion that a ‘revolutionary war’ would make the distinction between aggression and 
self-defence meaningless. Yet this latter assertion relied in some form of the classic 
theory of just war, because it was affirmed that the war is always started by the 
oppressor classes. As the negotiations that followed Bloody Sunday failed, Lenin’s call 
received some form of response in the Moscow Uprising that took place in December of 
1905, and the events only confirmed him in his belief that, as in the French precedent, 
the pathway of war was made necessary by the circumstances. As he reflected on the 
experience of the Moscow Uprising, Lenin put forward explicitly his idea that the 
progress of the revolution was to be invariably accompanied by an increasingly violent 
response from reactionary forces, making the preparation of the workers for civil war an 
imperative: 
   
[…] the sequence of events in Moscow in the December days, strikingly 
confirmed one of Marx’s profound propositions: revolution progresses 
by giving rise to a strong and united counter-revolution […] We would 
be deceiving both ourselves and the people if we concealed from the 
masses the necessity of a desperate, bloody war of extermination, as the 
immediate task of the coming revolutionary action.
121
  
 
The identification of civil war with traditional warfare which is salient in Lenin’s 
thought from his early writings is based, as E.H. Carr accurately noted,
122
 on the 
experience of the French revolutionaries, to which Lenin looked constantly as a solid 
precedent for revolutionary struggle. It was specifically the experience of the Paris 
Commune of 1871, though, that was the most instructive for Lenin. Marx had seen in 
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the Commune the first revolutionary government in history. In his 1908 article entitled 
Lessons of the Commune, he asserted that the experiment of the Commune had failed as 
a consequence of the ‘excessive magnanimity of the proletariat’: ‘instead of destroying 
its enemies it sought to exert moral influence on them; it underestimated the 
significance of direct military operations in civil war […]’. This is a lesson that the 
proletariat should bear in mind, as it did in the December Uprising of 1905, he added.
123
 
 
 
The Failed ‘Eschatological’ Judgement 
 
The conflict between the Menshevik gradualist and manoeuvring solution and Lenin’s 
strong call for a popular armed uprising is the first historical over war that was set forth 
in the research puzzle of this dissertation. It raises the question of what explains Lenin’s 
bellicose ‘turn’, and why did the Menshevik reacted differently to the very same facts. 
What was the decisive factor? Why Lenin reversed what he had said in What is to be 
Done? A key, it is proposed here, is given in Two Tactics of Social Democracy. There 
Lenin rhetorically wonders if he is mistaken about the fact that the Revolution had 
started, and dismissed that possibility.
124
 It was his belief that that moment was a 
revolutionary moment and that cannot be missed was decisive. The massacre 
perpetrated by the monarchy opened the door for the greatest threat, but also for the 
greatest opportunity, and the tool of the monarchy to crush the revolution was the tool 
to defeat the monarchy itself. 
This belief seems to be the result of Lenin’s reading of past revolutionary 
experiences. In Lenin’s framework of understanding, both the German revolutionaries 
of 1848 and those of the French Commune missed their revolutionary momentum by 
refusing to wage a war against counter-revolution at the same level that it waged it 
against them. Both showed the absolute threat of counter-revolution, but their partial 
victory was also a witness of the great promise. Lenin, in turn, was convinced that the 
revolutionary moment has arrived for them, and should not be missed. The radical and 
abrupt reversal of the reflective and well-crafted strategy of What is to be Done? 
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suggests that Lenin’s call for civil war in 1905 cannot be explained in terms of 
realpolitik alone, and that an ideological input is needed. Lenin’s vision of history, his 
own kairos, led his correlation between careful study of the circumstances and 
developmental teleology to a collapse. The circumstances were petrified into a 
revolutionary kairos in his mind, and this required for him the most extreme, radical 
action.   
The Mensheviks and other agents reacted differently to the same facts because 
they saw them through mental different lenses. As Alexander Wendt and other 
constructivist scholars have argued, the meaning of material structures is mediated by 
‘immaterial structures’ of ‘shared knowledge’, and, hence, they can be interpreted 
differently, even in a condition of permanence.
125
 The facts were, of course, necessary 
to turn Lenin’s strategy upside down, but their influence was mediated by an 
‘immaterial structure’, namely, his own ideology and his own interpretation of the 
Marxist canon and revolutionary politics. It was made possible, certainly, by his 
personal psychological disposition —which no qualms about paying the price, or to had 
others paying it, with comes with a civil war.  
Nevertheless, as is known, the revolutionary time was missed. The monarchy 
agreed to make some liberal concessions, but retained his power, and the old order was 
preserved. The bourgeois democratic revolution failed to arrive, but the revolution was 
not crushed. Lenin had manifested before that every defeat of the workers’ movement 
made it stronger, so he felt assured in resuming a more gradualist work. Another 
revolutionary moment will come in 1914, but this time its urgency will be stronger, both 
by the magnitude of the events and by the conjunction of different ideas, and the 
revolution will be victorious, at least partially. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
125
 Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security, 20:1, 1995, 73. 
 57 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
FROM IMPERIALIST WAR TO CIVIL WAR 
 
 
Before 1914, the fear of a Great European War and its possible consequences was a 
major concern among the socialists, to the point that the Second International Socialists 
became widely known for its intense pacifist activity.
126
 But the understanding of war 
and the actions that were required in its context deeply divided the socialists. For Lenin 
and the Bolsheviks, however, internal concerns were more important, and only during 
the time of the onset of the War did they devote time to study the issue.
127
 The War 
ultimately brought a Revolution and a civil war to Russia, a transformation of socialism, 
and a great number of changes in Europe. The Bolsheviks recognised in the Great War 
the most suitable time for seizing power, and they were successful. Their views and 
positions on war proved to be decisive. This chapter seeks to trace the development of 
these ideas.    
 
 
The War Debate among the Socialists 
 
The First International had ended with few pronouncements on war, and with general 
instructions calling workers in the various countries to adopt neutrality, and to promote 
strikes against war.
128
 The Second International could not avoid the topic as the 
expectations of a great world conflict became realistic. In the Seventh Congress 
celebrated in Stuttgart, in 1907, a clash of opinions took place. Western social-
democrats insisted on responding to any war with strikes, whilst others promoted 
pacifism. German representatives claimed that the workers should be allowed to fight 
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for their own countries, a position that disgusted Lenin intensely.
129
 As a Marxist, Lenin 
believed that national wars were the product of the continuous manipulation of the 
masses by the bourgeoisie. These bourgeois elites deceived the workers to make them 
fight and die for bourgeois interests instead of the true interests of the proletariat. 
Lenin had repelled any traditional moral duty to protect one’s own country 
already in 1905, when he called the Russian workers to support the defeat of the tsarist 
armies in the Russo-Japanese war, since he thought that a tsarist defeat would benefit 
the proletarian cause.
130
 He wrote in 1915 about the Great War that: ‘[…] the peoples 
are being deceived with “national” ideology and the term of “defence of the fatherland”, 
by the present-day imperialist bourgeoisie, in the war now being waged between 
slaveholders with the purpose of consolidating slavery.’131 Lenin’s proposal in the 
Stuttgart Congress was not to oppose the incoming wars, although he condemned them 
in principle as wars of oppression and plunder, but ‘to utilise the crisis created by war in 
order to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie’. He reiterated that ‘[…] war is a 
necessary product of capitalism, and that the proletariat cannot renounce participation in 
revolutionary wars, for such wars are possible […].’132  
Divergence of opinions on this particular problem continued until the onset of 
the First World War, and eventually led to collapse of the Second International. 
‘Centrists’ argued for pacifism, Kautsky supported a German victory as the most 
convenient for the proletarian cause —following the Marxist principle of supporting the 
side that best favours the Revolution— and Plekhanov maintained the old position of a 
general strike.
133
 Lenin opposed all these ideas, and promoted instead the famous slogan 
of the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, which implied the support 
of the defeat of the one’s own country. In his view the pathway of the civil war was 
made necessary by the context of the war: ‘[a] revolution in wartime means civil war; 
the conversion of a war between governments into a civil war is, on the one hand, 
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facilitated by military reverses ("defeats") of governments; on the other hand, one 
cannot actually strive for such a conversion without thereby facilitating defeat.’134 
The proposal of the Bolsheviks to use the war as catalyst of Revolution was 
never popular among the European socialists. Jean Jaures believed that a Revolution 
would develop if the War was unleashed, but he held to the position of promoting a 
general strike against it.
135
 Charles Rappoport warned that the War could be a 
wellspring for Revolution as much as a tool to crush it.
136
 Otto Bauer believed that 
Revolution would be impossible during the War, because all the forces of counter-
revolution would be concentrated.
137
 Most Europeans rulers and officials, in turn, 
underestimated the possibility of Revolution, as they underestimated most of the lasting 
effects of the War. The Bolshevik position was radically different. They held to the 
view that this War was the most indicated time to achieve their revolution, and such a 
time might not come again if missed. 
 
 
Lenin and Clausewitz 
 
The context of the Great War forced Lenin to focus in the problem of war and peace, 
and hastened the maturation and systematization of his thought on the matter. The scale 
of the violence and the unprecedented massive involvement of populations in the Great 
War, along with the failure of the Second International in achieving a consensus, 
pressed Lenin to seek precise and articulated responses to the questions that such event 
arouse for the interests of the Bolshevik movement. This was a period of intense study 
and literary production for him. Although the general ideas put forward in his early 
writings were to be preserved in essence, various factors converged to orientate the 
course of his thought in a concrete way and to give to it a distinctive shape. 
Interested in acquiring a proper understanding of the political aspects of war, 
Lenin devoured a large number of books, including Clausewitz’s On War. He became 
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fascinated with this book and found its theories akin to Hegel, Marx, and Engels.
138
 Part 
from his interest for this came from the fact that Marx and Engels themselves had 
shown some respect to him.
139
 Lenin borrowed Clausewitz famous dictum that ‘war is 
the continuation of policy by other means’, and made it the very central slogan of his 
own philosophy of war, and it is by this slogan that such philosophy would be more 
widely known. Lenin’s admiration for Clausewitz, whom he called ‘one of the greatest 
authorities on military matters,
140
 as well as the admiration of Marx and Engels, is 
intriguing, given the latter’s lack of anything closer to ‘revolutionary’ credentials. 
There is much in Clausewitz with is similar to the main features of Lenin’s 
outlook. Thus, for example, pretty much like Lenin, Clausewitz disliked abstraction and 
valued theory that was deeply orientated towards action.
141
 Lenin’s use of the dictum 
‘war is the continuation of policy through other means’ has been the source of much 
confusion, and it is arguably an example of a reading of a text that is made detached 
from context, without careful consideration of the meaning and purpose of the text in 
the context in which it emerged. As was argued in the second chapter, this tendency to 
assess Bolshevism through the lenses of Clausewitz’s has contributed to blur the latter’s 
revolutionary character. The Bolshevik approach to war has been seen as the 
employment of war as a tool for policy as best suited the interests of the party. In this 
view, however, the effects of the revolutionary commitments of the Bolsheviks in the 
outlook and practice are not captured.  
Lenin's use of the dictum is understood if it is taken into account that his purpose 
was to refute the arguments of the European socialists about the nature of First World 
War. Peter Vigor acknowledged this, but did not fully develop the implications of this 
fact.
142
 The purpose of Lenin was simply to condemn the War completely and to refute 
the various arguments set forth by the European socialists who refused to accept his 
idea of using it as a catalyst for Revolution. By stating that war was the continuation of 
policy, Lenin was asserting that all European powers involved in the War were no more 
than pursuing their previous imperialist policies, and that there was no reason to support 
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any side in the conflict. The heated dispute with the European socialists and the urgency 
of his political agenda explains why Lenin insisted so much in the Clausewitzian 
slogan. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to take this principle as the key for the 
Bolshevik approach to war for the reason stated above. 
 
 
Imperialism 
 
More important for the development of Lenin’s thought on war was, perhaps, his 
economic analysis of the causes of the First World War, which he divulged in his 
famous and influential work Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916). 
Applying Marxist theory to international affairs, in contrast with Western authors, he 
identified the causes of the war in the internal and inherent contradictions of capitalism: 
concretely, the necessities provoked by the accumulation of capital in of the dominant 
capitalist states. This economic analysis was crucial for his overall theory of war 
particularly for its emphasis in the proclivity to armed conflict of the capitalist nations, 
and the notion that as the crisis of capitalism would increase, the aggressiveness of 
capitalist power would steadily increase. This characterisation of the ‘other’ in the 
international realm as inherently aggressive and prone to unleash wars permeated the 
subsequent writings of Lenin and left an enduring mark in Soviet military theory. 
Among the European socialists, consensus on the issue of imperialism was never 
reached. The notion of imperialism as a ‘highest stage’ of capitalism did not come 
originally from Lenin; it has been introduced initially in Germany by the socialist Georg 
Ledebour.
143
 Only radicals such as Karl Radek and Paul Lensch tended to agree with 
Lenin in his assessment of the irreversible crisis of capitalism. Rosa Luxembourg had 
also called the workers to hasten the collapse of capitalism.
144
 For the majority, 
nonetheless, imperialism showed not only tendencies towards destabilisation but also to 
equilibrium, and the expectation of a balanced order, and international, did not seem so 
distant. Rudolf Hilferding argued that capitalism could be stabilised if the potencies 
agreed to share spoils.
145
 There was a common view that new circumstance could help 
                                               
143
 Georges Haupt. Socialism and the Great War, 147. 
144
 Georges Haupt. Socialism and the Great War, 153-5. 
145
 Georges Haupt. Socialism and the Great War, 149. 
 62 
 
to moderate the contradictions of capitalism. The European socialists believed that war 
was not inevitable, but the Bolsheviks could not follow them on this. 
 
 
Revolution and War 
 
Lenin’s intense period of study helped him to formulate his systematic philosophy of 
war, the main tenets of which were divulged in the aforementioned pamphlet Socialism 
and War (1915). This work aimed at providing a response to the very first concern of 
the socialists at that time: their position in face of the war, and the collapse of the 
Second International. He condemns war as ‘barbarous and brutal’ but insists that, unlike 
‘bourgeois pacifists’, socialists do understand the connection of war and economic class 
division: ‘[…] we understand that war cannot be abolished unless classes are abolished 
and Socialism is created […]’. That peace cannot be but the result of civil war is 
categorically stated: ‘Whoever wants a lasting and democratic peace must stand for civil 
war against the governments and the bourgeoisie.’ 146  
Lenin defined two categories of war, which he designated alternatively by 
various epithets: (a) ‘just’, ‘progressive’ and ‘defensive’, (b) and ‘unjust’, ‘reactionary’, 
‘aggressive’, the former was especially assigned to wars of national liberation against 
imperialist potencies, as previously mentioned, and the latter reserved the wars 
conducted by the imperialist for the sake of plunder, territorial expansion, and so on. 
This was a judgement of war by its purposes, but the purpose was essentially absorbed 
in the agent, and what mattered eventually was the agent: whether it was an imperialist 
country or a colony or intervened country. Lenin preserved the Marxist judgement of 
war by historical reason, acknowledging that some wars had progressive consequences, 
regardless of whether they waged for reactionary purposes. The object of the Franco-
Prussian War was plunder, he said, but the liberation of Germans from feudalism that 
followed from it was a progressive consequence
147
. He refused to apply the principle to 
the Great War, though. 
The World War was defined by Lenin as an imperialist war in all respects, and 
thus, it was unthinkable for any socialist to take part on it in favour of any side. This 
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was the very object of his fiery polemic with Kautsky and the German Social-
Democrats, who supported the workers’ right to fight for their own countries. But the 
circumstances were crucial for the movement, he thought. The radical nature of the 
situation called for revolutionary action, and this action in the context of a great war 
cannot be but civil war. His belief that the aggressiveness of imperialist countries would 
increase along with the decay of socialism, and the Marxist dictum ‘that every war 
contain the seeds of other wars’ pressed him to the conviction that action must not be 
postponed: ‘[d]own with mawkishly sanctimonious and fatuous appeals for “peace at 
any price”! Let us raise high the banner of civil war! […] this war will soon be followed 
by others, unless there are a series of successful revolutions […].’148  
These calls to civil war show that Lenin had little regard for the costs of his 
proposed path of actions, the serious consequences of adding internal violence to what 
was already an enormously violent situation, and thus contributing to the maintenance 
of the deadly spiral. On the other hand, the calls were conceived as a response to 
imperialism, upon whose shoulders resided the responsibility of starting the spiral. As 
he had written two years before:       
 
“You shoot first, Messieurs the Bourgeoisie!” Engels wrote in 1891, 
advocating, most correctly, the use of bourgeois legality by us, 
revolutionaries, in the period of so-called peaceful constitutional 
development. Engels’s idea was crystal clear: we class-conscious 
workers, he said, will be the next to shoot; it is to our advantage to 
exchange ballots for bullets (to go over to civil war) at the moment the 
bourgeoisie itself has broken the legal foundation it has laid down.
149
 
 
Lenin showed an awareness that the most powerful nations were rushing in an arms 
race, and this fact led him to affirm that militarisation was imposed upon the workers as 
a necessity, despite the ideological opposition of socialism to militarism. Given that ‘the 
bourgeoisie was armed to teeth’, to follow a path other than civil war ‘would have 
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meant, in practice, “proclaiming a Revolution” (with the wrong revolutionary 
programme!).’150 He reaffirmed the same in the pamphlet The Military Programme of 
the Proletarian Revolution: 
 
The whole of social life is now being militarised. […] The women of an 
oppressed and really revolutionary class […] will say to their sons: “You 
will soon be grown up. You will be given a gun. Take it and learn the 
military art properly. The proletarians need this knowledge not to shoot 
your brothers, the workers of other countries […]. They need it to fight 
the bourgeoisie of their own country, to put an end to exploitation, 
poverty and war, […] by defeating and disarming the bourgeoisie.”151 
 
 
The Crucial Revolutionary Momentum 
 
The same process that could be observed in 1905 is noticeable in 1914, but with a 
greater intensity. The attitudes and positions of Lenin and the Bolsheviks are fully 
understandable only if their belief in the presence of a revolutionary momentum is taken 
into account. The Great European War posed an unprecedented threat for humanity and 
for the Revolution itself, but at the same time opened the door the greatest opportunity. 
In this point, Lenin and the Bolshevik seemed to closely follow Engels’s in his 
assertions about the incoming European War. The chaos could serve as cradle for the 
Revolution, and the War would mean not only destruction but also the start of the 
World Revolution. If the Revolution did not happen, the work of the socialists might 
have been reduced to dust and force a new start from scratch. The absolute threat and 
the absolute promise were present for the Bolsheviks in a stronger form in which they 
did in 1905. 
There were various factors that led to this belief. The first of all is, course, the 
fact of the War itself, and its potential destructiveness. In addition, the intensifying 
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contradictions of capitalism meant that the aggressiveness of the European potencies 
would not decrease. General militarisation and the arms race was also increase. As 
every war carries the seeds of new wars, the general and long-term outcome of the Great 
War could even worse than it was in itself.  The development of their doctrine on war 
can only be understood in this context: it is also a product of the violence of the time. 
The violence of the tsarist regime, the cruelties of the Great War, the outcomes of 
imperialism, the Western arms race, are all part of a spiral of violence to which Lenin 
was adding an additional layer. Lenin was committed to attain his objectives, regardless 
of the costs and consequences, but he was very pragmatic in the use of means. A 
profoundly violent ambience led him to believe that the objectives cannot be reached 
except in that way.    
But the concrete reading of the events had a role also. Lenin was reading the 
circumstances through his own ideological lenses, and these lenses led him to see in the 
events the evidence that supported the path of ‘militarisation’. Whilst other socialists 
such as Kautsky could envisage different perspectives and then oppose the Bolsheviks 
methods, Lenin’s own ideology pointed to another direction: the contradictions of 
capitalism, then in its last stage, would aggravate, capitalist nations would become more 
aggressive and new wars would be unleashed, and imperialist coalitions against the new 
socialist state would form. The experience of the French revolutionaries and the Paris 
Commune showed, for him, that Kautsky’s methods would precipitate the end of the 
revolution. The role of the context, therefore, cannot be understood separated from the 
ideological perception of it by a given agent, as Constructivism insists. 
The answer to the question of why the Bolsheviks and the European socialists, 
or the European Marxists in particular diverged over the issue of war, having the same 
‘canon’, more or less the same objectives, experiencing the same international 
circumstances, and so on, is simply that they had a different interpretative framework. 
The outlook of the European socialists was more emancipated and then could navigate 
better throughout the possibilities — even if it totally failed in producing unity in the 
international movement. The Bolshevik interpretation of this situation was more limited 
in choice, more narrow in vision. It led to the petrification of the circumstances into a 
revolutionary kairos, and this, in turn, led to an extreme position in which the all costs 
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were worth paying for them. Ultimately, their Revolution succeeded at a very high cost, 
but their World Revolution, the great promise, never came.      
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CHAPTER SIX 
WORLD REVOLUTION AND WAR 
 
 
The Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917. The initially formed a coalition with the 
Social Revolutionaries, the Party supported by the majority of the peasants, and that 
won the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November of that year. But the 
coalition was dissolved after Lenin agreed to negotiate the peace with Germany and 
started the collectivisation of agriculture. The Social Revolutionaries then formed an 
alternate government and a civil war between the two factions was unleashed. Later on, 
military units that were allied to the industrialists that had been deprived by the 
Revolution staged entered the war, with support of the Allied. The Bolsheviks would 
have to win this war to survive.
152
 Their hopes rested in the promise of the World 
Revolution that would come after the first flame had appeared in Russia. In this phase, 
revolutionary warfare reached its highest point, albeit it was unsuccessful in achieving 
the promise that motivated it, and then faded. This chapter addresses the main aspects of 
these developments.  
 
 
War and the Socialist State 
 
For Lenin, the February Revolution meant, finally, ‘the beginning of the transformation 
of the imperialist war into a civil war’.153 After the October Revolution and the 
substantive change of scenario and position of the Bolsheviks in the political sphere, 
from belligerent party of opposition to ruling party, the new regime had to face some 
general problems whose eventual solution had some influence in Lenin’s theory of war. 
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The major was the definition of the form of state that the new proletarian Russia should 
adopt. He discussed this aspect in The Task of the Proletariat in Our Revolution where 
he rejects the possibility of forming a parliamentary democratic republic and supports, 
instead, a regime of the ‘Paris Commune type’, where the army and police are ‘replaced 
by the direct arming of the people […]’ The reason was simple: parliamentarism allows 
the ‘old machinery’ to survive and a reversion to pre-revolutionary phase is impossible, 
whereas the Commune would “smash that machinery” 154 
The polemic against Kautsky became more heated, given the latter’s misgivings 
about the methods of the Bolsheviks in seizing power and organizing the new state. 
Against the violence and harshness of Bolshevist practice, Kautsky, who was now 
declared by Lenin to be a ‘renegade’ and an ‘apostate’ insisted, in the words of Lenin, 
in’[…] peaceful democracy, without civil war, without a dictatorship and with good 
statistics […] a revolution without revolution, without fierce struggle, without violence’. 
155
 Lenin on the other hand, believed that the anti-Bolshevik revolt headed by Cadet 
Ataman Kaledin in 1917, ‘[…] destroyed every chance of setting in a formally 
democratic way the very acute problems with which history has confronted the peoples 
of Russia […].’156  
The connection between war and revolution became, then, solidified in Lenin’s 
thought, and through him in Bolshevism. In his analysis of Lenin’s 1917 work entitled 
State and Revolution, James Ryan argued that Lenin sketched already at that time the 
general lines of the violent ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ that would later be 
established in Russia.
157
 France remained, as it were, the role model of the revolutionary 
praxis: ‘[…] the Paris Commune waged war against Versailles as the workers’ 
government of France against the bourgeois government. What have “pure democracy” 
and “universal suffrage” to do with it, when Paris was deciding the fate of France?’158 
And he claimed to have the force of experience on his side: ‘Bolshevism has indicated 
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the right road of escape from the horrors of war and imperialism, […] Bolshevism can 
serve as a model of tactics for all.’159  
Historians have for a long time identified the phase of political consolidation 
from 1918 to 1922 as ‘war communism’, but some recent scholars consider the concept 
inappropriate inasmuch as it fails to take into account Lenin’s main purpose of 
reconstruction in conditions of agreed peace.
160
 Without neglecting the value of these 
observations, thought, it might be argued that the concept still expresses one essential 
feature of the shape adopted by the regime. The Chapter II, Article 1 of the Constitution 
of 1918 prescribed that the workers must be armed, and Getzler Considered this 
document as the clearest embodiment of Lenin’s connection between war and 
revolution. In his view ‘[…] the Constitution amounts to little less than a declaration of 
war on the bourgeois capitalist world.’161 
As Marx and Engels believed that the Revolution would spread fast throughout 
the world, once started, bringing with it the withering away of the state, there was little 
normative content to be found in them to determine the character of the relations 
between socialist states, much less was there any indication of the principles that should 
regulate the proletarian state in world of stable capitalist countries. The most immediate 
expectation was war. The bourgeois countries would seek sooner or later to crush the 
socialist country, and war would be then, unavoidable: ‘[o]ur press has always spoken 
of the need to prepare for a revolutionary war in the event of the victory of socialism in 
one country with capitalism still in existence in the neighbouring countries. That is 
indisputable.’162 The intervention of the entente and the blockade cannot but confirm 
Lenin is his belief. 
Lenin could find strong reasons to explain away this eventuality. Since the 
capitalist development is uneven, not uniform, for the creation of inequalities belongs to 
its essence, it appeared reasonable to think that not all countries might arrive at the 
revolutionary stage at the same time: ‘[u]neven economic and political development is 
an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several 
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or even in one capitalist country alone.’163 Once the revolution has been accomplished 
in one country, the newly-formed proletarian government must have to pursue an 
international mission: to support the socialists in other countries, in their struggle 
against the bourgeoisie. In 1915 already, Lenin had even contemplated the possibility of 
the use of force against other capitalist states, in order to help the proletarians of these 
countries. In On the Slogan for a United States of Europe, he wrote: 
 
Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one 
capitalist country alone. After expropriating the capitalists and 
organising their own socialist production, the victorious proletariat of 
that country will arise against the rest of the world— the capitalist 
world—attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, 
stirring uprisings in those countries against the capitalists, and in case of 
need using even armed force against the exploiting classes and their 
states.
164
 
 
 
The Unfortunate Peace 
 
Once the power had been seized, the Bolsheviks could adopt the idea of the ‘defence of 
the fatherland’, for the Russian state no longer represented the interests of the 
bourgeoisie. But Lenin arrived at the conclusion that, given the weak condition of the 
nascent Bolshevik regime, a peace with Germany was the most convenient path, even is 
that peace involved strong concessions. Lenin’s call for negotiating the peace with 
Germany was a radical step, for it met with the opposition of the Social Revolutionaries 
and with many members of the Bolshevik party, including Trotsky and Bukharin, all of 
whom expected to that a ‘revolutionary war’ would waged against Germany. Against 
almost all of them, Lenin stood alone in arguing for a policy that seemed to contradict 
his previous statements and his own convictions. Lenin, however, could impose his will 
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upon the party, and the Bolsheviks, then, agreed to sign the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 
ceding Ukraine and the Baltic states.  
This appears to be an act of pure realpolitik, and seems to contradict the main 
argument of this dissertation. If the Bolsheviks were urged by an ‘eschatological’ 
judgement of the circumstances, if they believed they had no time to lose for achieving 
their objectives, why did they choose to retreat in this particular point? As John M. 
Thompson pointed out, however, the reason why Lenin chose peace with Germany was 
that he feared that end of the war would precipitate a coalition of the capitalist world 
against Russia. It was more convenient for him that the hostility between Germany and 
Britain be maintained, so that such a capitalist coalition against Russia would not 
happen.
165
 He expected to gain time in order to allow local revolutions to emerge in 
Europe.   
But in the same way that imperialist powers used period of peace to regain 
strength to participate in future conflicts, Lenin maintained that the peace was not, in 
any way, a compromise with imperialism, but a strategic step to allow the proletarian 
state to organize and regain strength. Lenin did not reject the revolutionary war against 
Germany, but simply wanted to postpone it. This ‘most harsh, oppressive, brutal, 
disgraceful peace’, he argued, was concluded ‘not to “capitulate” to imperialism but in 
order to learn and prepare to fight against imperialism in a serious effective manner’.166  
Understandably, he was reproached by some of the party members for insisting so many 
times in the waging of a revolutionary war, and changing the discourse to support a 
peace with Germany. He responded to this admonishment in On the History of the 
Question of an Unfortunate Peace, where he remarked that he would not support a 
revolutionary war unless there were conditions for it. Starting a revolutionary war 
depended entirely, he said, on ‘[…] whether material conditions permit it, and of the 
interests of the socialist revolution which has already begun.’167 
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Exporting the Revolution 
 
The escalation of the Russian civil war, the possibility of an intervention of the Entente 
in Russia, and the international support given to the Whites, made the position of the 
Bolsheviks extremely complicated, and to some extent intensified their belief of the 
inevitability of the war between capitalism and communism, and the necessity to 
prepare the new state for war. Despite the traditional socialist opposition to the arms 
race, Lenin was convinced that the conditions of the time made totally expedient for the 
new proletarian Russian state to form and employ its own army, and as the provisions 
Constitution of 1918 showed, the Bolsheviks were interested in arming and preparing 
Russian all workers for war. Writings of the time demonstrate that the belief in the 
incoming military help from the proletariat in the West was crucial in maintaining 
Lenin’s motivation to pursue his political objectives, despite all the negative 
circumstances. Several times, as Thompson remarked, Lenin referred to the actions of 
the Bolshevik government as ‘holding on’ until the help from the West came.168 
  The peace of Brest-Litovsk was short-lived, nevertheless, given the defeat of 
Germany in First World War, and its withdrawal from the Eastern territories was 
followed by an offensive of the Red Army with the purpose of establishing Communist 
regimes in the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland.
169
 The campaign failed in 
Estonia, and Poland, and although it succeeded in forming Soviet Republics in Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Belarus, these regimes were all of short duration. Having to deal with an 
intensive civil war and with a state organization and economic base still in weak 
conditions, the Red Army had to retreat from the Baltic region, and Belarus. The 
campaign was successful, though, in establishing a Soviet government in Ukraine. The 
offensive in Poland led to the Polish-Soviet War, in which the Soviet troops were 
strongly resisted and forced to retreat after two years.
170
  
  The campaign in Poland was of particular importance for Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks, for the country was geopolitically crucial due to its proximity to 
Germany,
171
 which in turn was the place where, so it was expected, the decisive 
                                               
168
 John Thompson, Lenin’s Analysis of Intervention, 158. 
169
 Robert Jones, The Soviet Concept of ‘Limited Sovereignty’, 31. 
170
 Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 81-2.  
171
 Robert Jones, The Soviet Concept of ‘Limited Sovereignty’, 33. 
 73 
 
proletarian revolution would have to take place.
172
 The advance of the Red Army 
toward Warsaw and the Bolshevik purpose of ‘sovietising’ it was justified by Lenin 
under the grounds that Russian troops were simply offering help to the Warsaw workers 
in their struggle against their exploiters. The mission of the army was to meet the 
workers in Warsaw and to tell them: ‘we have come to your aid’, although he seems to 
have had little concern on whether the Polish workers wanted such an aid.
173
 This 
understanding was shared by Lenin’s fellow revolutionaries. Karl Radek affirmed that 
‘the Polish working class […] knows very well that Russia does not threaten the 
independence of the Polish people, but that she wants to help the Polish workers to 
sunder the chains forged for them by Poland’s capitalists and the Entente.’174 
  As the ‘fraternal aid’ from the West did not come, then, the new Bolshevik state 
considered itself in position of offering military help to the workers of other countries 
that were allegedly in need of it for the overthrow of their local bourgeoisie and the 
establishment of socialism. The statements of various Bolshevik leaders during the 
period of the westward advance of the Red Army show explicit support for 
‘revolutionary wars’ in that form. Robert Jones pointed out that Zinoviev believed that 
‘any effort by the Red Army to extend the Revolution beyond the borders of the Soviet 
Union —at bayonet point — was justified’, and quoted Bukharin affirming that ‘the 
proletariat as a state must fight against bourgeois states […] for the victory of 
communism […].’ In 1922, Bukharin had held that the workers should conquer the 
world only through bayonets, and therefore, the ‘right of red intervention’ should be 
included in the programme of the Communist International.
 175
   
  Despite the failures of the advances of the Red Army in the Eastern territories, 
‘red intervention’ was successful in ‘sovietisation’ Georgia, which at the time of the 
Russian civil war possessed a Menshevik government. This intervention was not 
entirely planned by the Bolsheviks leaders in Moscow, but was instigated by Stalin and 
other officials who requested permission to advance into Georgia to support the workers 
of the country. The campaign led to a full scale intervention, and the substitution of 
Menshevik rule for a Bolshevik government. In the first edition of the Bolshaya 
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Sovietskaya Entsyklopediya, published under Stalinism, the intervention and subsequent 
“bolshevisation” of Georgia is described as a “revolutionary war”, in the sense of a war 
to defend the gains of socialism against counter-revolutionaries.
176
  
  The formation of the Third International or Comintern embodied, at least in its 
first years, the Bolshevik intention to spread revolution worldwide through military 
intervention.
177
 This ‘iron international proletarian organization’, Zinoviev affirmed, 
would be able ‘to beat the enemy everywhere’ and would give ‘any one of its troops the 
greatest possible help, at any moment’.178 One of the main objectives of Zinoviev, as 
head of the Comintern, was to trigger the long-expected proletarian revolution in 
Germany. This policy did not live long, though, for the Soviet leadership was led to 
accept the failure of the socialist revolutions in the West and to admit the possibility of 
a ‘peaceful coexistence’ with capitalism. The Comintern focused, then, in pitting 
Western Communist parties against their Socialist Democratic counter-parts, and later 
in forming a united international front against Fascism.
179
 The early militant 
interventionist impetus yielded its place to a more pragmatic international behaviour. 
  This phase of Bolshevik foreign and military policy ended approximately in 
1922, at the same time that the Russian civil war finished, and when Lenin’s leadership 
began to wane as a consequence of his health problems. Assuring an internal and 
external peace, the Soviet state turned its attention to economic reform, 
industrialization, collectivisation, and regime consolidation. The previous factors that 
had solidified the Bolshevik beliefs on the imminence of a war between capitalism and 
socialism slowly lost their force and importance, conceding their space to doctrines such 
as ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘socialism in one country’.180 The Soviet leadership, 
henceforth, will abandon public endorsement of ‘revolutionary war’ in the sense of 
intervention to spread socialism, and will concentrate its military doctrine in promoting 
preparation for war in defence of ‘the gains of socialism’ against imperialist aggression 
and internal counter-revolution, upholding at the same time a campaign to portray 
socialist countries as essentially peaceful and non-aggressive. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
By the end of the 19th century, before developing concerns with organised political 
agitation against the Russian monarchy, most of the activities of Lenin were focused in 
refuting ideological perspectives that competed against orthodox Marxism for the 
intellectual headship of Russian Social Democracy. The main claim advanced by him 
was that representatives of Narodnichestvo and the ‘economists’ did not understand the 
historical process through which the consciousness of the Russian workers developed, 
in interaction with the development of capitalism in the particular Russian conditions, 
and hence they failed to appreciate the correct course of action and the convenient 
political strategies that that specific juncture demanded. They identified as the proper 
objective of Russian Social Democracy what belonged just to the initial phases of the 
process of growth or revolutionary consciousness. At this point, Lenin found himself in 
general agreement with both Plekhanov and Kautsky, his future critics.  
 
The same formal structure of this critique might be applied with the Bolsheviks views 
on war after the 1917 Revolution. The Leninist critique to the Socialist International 
focused in stating that European socialists had failed in understanding the specificities 
of the historical juncture, and hence were incapable to adduce what the Bolsheviks 
believed to be the most appropriate measures needed for the circumstance. The failure 
and collapse of the International seemed to give support to these claims. Lenin’s texts at 
the time evidence a belief that the juncture, the phase in the historical process in which 
they were immersed, was profoundly critical, and that a course of action devised by him 
was necessary and could only take place at that particular point. The critical phase 
would create an international setting that would make entirely impossible that course of 
action, as Engels had seemingly predicted.  
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In this context, the Bolshevik theory of war was not essentially a Clausewitzian theory 
of war as a tool of the state, but of war as the ‘last war’ that would pave the way for a 
revolution that should abolish war altogether. The doctrinal content of the early 
Bolshevik military doctrine was functional to a political strategy that was believed to be 
a concrete response to a crucial and decisive point in history that would eliminate the 
employed means themselves. The implications of this kind of mentality are, firstly, that 
all the activities associated with the war would require an extraordinary and universal 
input of energy; secondly, that more risks are allowed, and more sacrifices are accepted, 
for the sacrifice is measured against the future scenario in which no more sacrifices are 
required; and thirdly, there is a tendency to ‘total war’ in connection with the 
extraordinary character which is given to the juncture. 
 
The key for understanding why, facing the same events, albeit from different positions, 
this ideological development was taken by the Bolsheviks, but not shared by the rest of 
socialist bodies, is to be found in the debate on imperialism, and in Lenin’s application 
of socialist principles to the concrete situation of the time, and the many ideological 
aspects assessed in the previous chapters. Whereas the European socialist could 
perceive better the complexity of the international order, and could give attention to 
both the factors of destabilisation and of stabilisation, Lenin’s historical rationality 
arranged the various pieces in a mental picture in which were all ordained to a critical 
point in which all efforts would turn meaningless if extreme actions were not taken. 
This mentality would be abandoned by Stalin, mainly through his theory of ‘socialism 
in one country’ and the Soviet view of war would then be approximated to the 
Clausewitzian view.     
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